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The work in question seeks to set a relatively novel form of biotechnology, synthetic biology, in the frame of European intellectual 
property law, with an additional focus on patent law. The primary questions that the thesis seeks to address are 1) is synthetic 
biology structurally incompatible with existing forms of patent law, and 2) if some incompatibility is evident, what measures are best 
suited to ameliorate it. Methodologically, the thesis is heavily oriented towards a combination of legal dogmatics for descriptive 
sections and a classical law & economics approach for the normative sections. 
 
The specific form of synthetic biology discussed in the thesis is the so-called biopart-approach (also known as biobricks), which 
seeks to standardize DNA and other cellular material into modular units, which can subsequently be constructed into devices and 
systems, implemented in a minimal genome chassis, resulting in a synthetically constructed organism. Such organisms may exhibit 
properties which are more commonly associated with e.g. computers. The fundamental difference between synthetic biology and 
other forms of genetic engineering is the introduction of true engineering principles, mathematical modelling, standardization, 
quality characterization, and modular construction. The research community involved in synthetic biology exhibits two distinct forms 
of IP practices: the IP frame is a continuation of pre-existing practises in biotechnology, in which innovations are typically 
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It is taken as a matter of course that the A2K frame will not exhibit major issues in innovation being hindered from within their own 
group. However, the same cannot be said in regards to the IP frame. 
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research tools are patentable subject-matter as defined in the Biotechnology Directive and EPC. One section of the thesis is 
devoted to exploring the implications of both EU and EPO jurisprudence on the patenting of synthetic biology. The main focus of 
the latter part of the work concentrates on the fact that many of the aforementioned elements of the bioparts approach are 
complementary goods. This raises a problem when they are granted in a disaggregated manner, as licensees must conduct a 
series of non-coordinated negotiations with multiple patent holders to obtain the upstream patents needed for the development of 
downstream commercial applications. This fragmentation of exclusionary rights is called an anticommons. Furthermore, patent 
claims may not be entirely independent, with the production of a seemingly discrete technology requiring the licensing of multiple 
overlapping input patents. This configuration is called a patent thicket. Given the international nature of synthetic biology research, 
and the ever increasing strain on patent offices and its concomitant effect on patent quality, it is possible that synthetic biology will 
exhibit both phenomena. Despite the difference in origin, these phenomena result in a similar series of market failure, namely a) 
royalty stacking, b) patent hold-up, and c) suboptimal transaction costs in the form of high bargaining costs and search costs. 
These problems exacerbate each other, and they tend to exhibit a somewhat monotonic relationship with increased patenting. 
Both anticommons and patent thickets are well-known and studied in relation to e.g. the ICT and semiconductor industries. 
 
The last section of the thesis explores various options to resolve both the anticommons and patent thicket. The options are divided 
into market solutions, such as cross-licensing, patent pooling and patent clearinghouses, as well as patent policy tools, such as 
patent quality management, public institution participation in the IP market and the role of courts as potential arbiters of innovation 
and utility. An underlying theme in the work is the presumed advent of the unitary patent system, as well as its accompanying 
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Kyseinen työ tutkii uutta bioteknologian muotoa, synteettistä biologiaa, ja sen suhdetta eurooppalaiseen immateriaalioikeuteen, 
erityisesti patenttioikeuteen. Tutkielman keskeiset kysymykset koskevat sen selvittämisestä, onko 1) synteettisen biologian 
keksinnöt systeemisesti soveltumattomia nykyiseen patenttioikeuteen, ja 2) mikäli näin on, mitä asialle tulisi tehdä. Metodologisesti 
työ on yhdistelmä lainoppia ja oikeustaloustiedettä. Lainopin rooli tutkimuksessa on deskriptiivinen, kun taas oikeustaloustiede 
toimii normatiivisen argumentaation lähteenä.  
 
Tutkielma keskittyy ns. bioparts-menetelmään, jossa DNAta ja muita biologisia materiaaleja pyritään standardoimaan ja 
modularisoimaan siten, että niistä on mahdollista rakentaa biolaitteita (devices) ja biojärjestelmiä (systems). Kyseiset järjestelmät 
puolestaan implementoidaan alustaan (chassis), kuten miminaaligenomin omaavaan e. coli-bakteeriin, jonka seurauksena on 
synteettisesti rakennettu ja suunniteltu eliö, jonka toiminta voi muistuttaa enemmän esimerkiksi tietokonetta kuin tavallista 
bakteeria. Synteettisen biologian keskeinen ero aiempaan bioteknologiaan on sen pyrkimys omaksua insinöörillisiä 
perusperiaatteita, kuten matemaattisia mallinnusmekanismeja, standardisaatiota, komponenttien karakterisaatiota ja modulaarisia 
rakennusperiaatteita.  
 
Itse synteettisen biologian tutkijat ovat jakaantuneet kahteen leiriin heidän immateriaalioikeudellisen suhtautumisen perusteella. 
Yhtäällä osa alan toimijoista kannattaa bioteknologiasta omaksuttuja käytäntöjä, joissa patenteilla on keskeinen rooli, toisaalta on 
puolestaan open source-mallin omaksuneet tutkijat, jotka pyrkivät jakamaan tietoa mahdollisimman vapaasti ja estämään 
immateriaalioikeuksien haitallisia vaikutuksia tutkimustyössä. Tutkielman oletusarvona on se, että open source-mallin toimijat eivät 
tule itse aiheuttaneeksi heikennyksiä innovaatiotoimintaan, mutta immateriaalioikeusmallin kannattajien toimien vaikutukset voivat 
kattaa molemmat ryhmät 
 
Bio-osat, laitteet, järjestelmät ja alustat ovat kaikki potentiaalisesti patentin arvoisia keksintöjä. Lisäksi synteettisen biologian 
primääriteknologiat, biotekniset standardit ja tutkimusvälineet ovat yhtä lailla patentoitavissa Bioteknologiadirektiivin ja Euroopan 
patenttisopimuksen mukaisesti. Tästä syystä yksi työn osio keskittyy tutkimaan Euroopan unionin ja Euroopan patenttitoimiston 
oikeiskäytäntöä, mitä kautta on mahdollista hahmottaa tulkintoja, joilla on vaikutuksia synteettisen biologian kehittämisprosessissa. 
Työn loppuosio rakentuu sen ajatuksen varaan, että monet em. keksinnöistä ovat komplementaarisia. Tästä voi aiheutua 
merkittäviä ongelmia jos ja kun patenttioikeuksia myönnetään sirpaloidusti, sillä käyttöluvan hakijan tulee solmia useita eri 
epäkoordinoituja lisenssisopimuksia useiden eri patentinhaltijoiden kanssa. Tilanne on erityisen haitallinen silloin, kun em. patentit 
ovat välttämättömiä uuden keksinnön kehittämisessä (ns. upstream-patentit). Fragmentaation seurauksena on ns. anticommons, 
joka suomeksi käännettynä lienee ”anti-yhteismaan ongelma”. Lisäksi upstream-patentit voivat olla jossain määrin päällekkäisiä, 
jolloin käyttöluvan hakijan tulee myös solmia useita lisenssisopimuksia usean eri patentinhaltijan kanssa. Tätä ilmiötä kutsutaan 
patent thicket:iksi, jonka suomennos lienee patenttiryteikkö. Molemman ilmiön seuraukset ovat pitkälti samankaltaisia, nimittäin a) 
lisenssimaksujen kasautuminen, b) patent hold-up ja c) epäoptimaalinen transaktiokustannusrakenne, erityisesti etsintä- ja 
neuvottelukustannusten osalta. Sekä anticommons-ilmiö että patenttiryteikkö ovat hyvin tunnettuja taloustieteellisiä ilmiöitä, sillä 
niitä on esiintynyt mm. tietotekniikan alalla runsaasti. 
 
Tutkielman viimeinen osuus esittää eri metodeja em. ongelmien selvittämiseen, joista yksi osa koostuu markkinaperusteisista 
ratkaisuista, kuten ristilisensoinnista, patent pool:eista ja patenttiselvitystoimistoista. Toinen osio koostuu enemmän 
patenttiviranomaisten omista linjanvedoista, erityisesti liittyen myönnettyjen patenttien laadunhallintaan, julkisyhteisöjen 
osallistumisesta synteettisen biologian kehitystoimintaan ja tuomioistuinten rooliin mahdollisten tehokkuushyötyjen tuojina. Koko 
tutkielman yhdistävänä teemana tältä osin on yhtenäispatenttijärjestelmän voimaantulo ja sen mahdolliset vaikutukset synteettisen 
biologian toimijoiden insentiivirakenteisiin. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Regio: Synthetica 
"WHAT I CANNOT CREATE, I CANNOT UNDERSTAND" – Richard Feynman 
– Quote encoded in the genome of the synthetic Mycoplasma 
laboratorium by researchers at the J. Craig Venter Institute1 
Since the discovery of DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953, our relationship with nature has 
undergone a fundamental shift.  Instead of being purely at the mercy of our evolutionary 
past, we humans have sought to modify the underlying structures of life to better suit our 
needs. The second major milestone in this endeavor was the development of recombinant 
DNA (rDNA) technology in 1973 by Cohen and Boyer, which allowed the introduction of 
strands of DNA from one species to another.23 Pioneering rDNA researchers were confident 
in the prospects of the new discipline, imagining a future in which life could be completely 
redesigned from the ground up, or in the words of Polish oncologist Wacław Szybalski, one 
that allows us to build a “new better mouse”4. It seemed that the advent of an era of synthetic 
organisms, the likes of which have never existed in nature, was imminent. 
Recombinant DNA and other related fields of biotechnology have undoubtedly thrived 
scientifically and economically in the intervening years: the global biotechnology industry 
was worth an estimated 216.5 billion US dollars in 2011, with a projected value of 414.5 
billion USD by the end of 20175, rising to 775.2 billion USD in 20246. However, rDNA 
technology did not quite live up to the expectations of Szybalski and others. This changed 
in the late 1990s, when, among others7, a graduate student by the name of Timothy S. 
Gardner was pondering how to recreate Luke Skywalker’s bionic arm from the movie Star 
Wars.8 His insight was to view the issue not only in terms of genetic engineering or 
molecular biology, but to add notions from fields such as electronic engineering and 
                                                 
1 JCVI Press release 2010, paragraph 12. 
2 Glick et al. 2010, p. 5. 
3 N.B.: Other major milestones of discovery include those of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in 1983, 
and the completion of the sequencing of the human genome in 2003. 
4 Szybalski 1974, p. 405.  
5 PRNewswire Summary 2014. 
6 GlobeNewswire Summary 2016. 
7 Other commonly cited pioneers of the field include Drew Endy, Tom Knight and J. Craig Venter. 
8 Gardner & Hawkings 2013, p. 871. 
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computer science.9 This idle notion resulted in serious research efforts, culminating in a 2000 
article published in the prestigious journal Nature. In the article, Gardner describes how he 
and other researches had developed a genetic toggle switch.10 If networked together, these 
switches could be used to create programmable and self-contained cellular memory circuits 
that enable the control of cellular functions11, broadly similar in concept to how an 
assemblage of transistors operates in a computer. This and other similar innovations 
generated a good deal of media attention at the time12, helping to breathe life to Szybalski’s 
idea of synthetic organisms. Bearing in mind Gardner’s combination of different scientific 
traditions, this new form of synthetic biology differed from its previous iteration by focusing 
on “reusable biological parts, predictive mathematical design and simulation of the circuit 
properties and elements of programmable digital logic”13.  
The ever increasing value of the biotechnology industry coupled with the cutting-edge nature 
of the research involved, as exemplified by synthetic biology, has put a strain on our existing 
legal systems in more ways than one. One major instance of such strain has been in the field 
of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Questions relating to the proprietary nature of 
biotechnological innovation in general have sparked controversy, leading to ongoing 
bioethical debate on what can and should be patentable.14 The legal side of this debate has 
centered on issues such as the patentability of organisms created by the use of recombinant 
DNA technologies15, as well as the intellectual property rights of genetic sequences found 
in nature16. Building on the advances of existing forms of biotechnology, synthetic biology 
is at least in part a subject of this ongoing debate. However, synthetic biology may 
potentially expand our mastery of biological systems in entirely new ways, which in turn 
have the potential to generate new and problematic IP scenarios. As such, it is hardly 
surprising that intellectual property dimension of synthetic biology has generated a 
substantial amount of academic interest among lawyers, economists and even synthetic 
biologists themselves.  
                                                 
9 Idem. p. 671. 
10 Gardner et al. 2000, passim. 
11 Idem. p. 342. 
12 See e.g.: Eisenberg 2000, passim.  
13 Gardner & Hawkins 2013, p. 871. 
14 For a summary of the main points of this debate, see e.g.: Stazi 2015, p. 49–56. 
15 See e.g.: EPO Technical Board of Appeal decisions T 0019/90 (Onco-mouse) and T 0315/03 (Transgenic 
animals/HARVARD) 
16 See e.g.: the US Supreme Court decision Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, No. 12-
398 (569 U.S. ___ June 13, 2013) and the EPO case T 1213/05 (Breast and ovarian cancer/UNIVERSITY 
OF UTAH), both revolving around the patenting of the naturally occurring BRCA1 and 2 genes. 
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Many national and intergovernmental institutions have begun to consider the challenges 
posed by the maturation of synthetic biology. In 2014, the OECD published an extensive 
multidisciplinary report on the subject, with a segment devoted specifically to IP policy 
considerations.17 The European Union has had its own discussion on the topic, culminating 
in 2014–2015 with the publishing of three opinions that consider 1) the definition of 
synthetic biology18, 2) risk assessment and safety aspects19, 3) possible environmental risks 
and research priorities in the field20. IPR-related issues are only briefly mentioned, albeit 
highlighting the challenges the technology may pose to the existing IPR paradigm.21 On a 
national level, the Finnish Academy of Sciences has its own multidisciplinary program, 
FinSynBio, which began in 2013 and is set to conclude in 2017. This program includes a 
research goal of studying the IP aspects of synthetic biology.22 However, this goal did not 
result in any grants being given to researchers23, which leads to the tenuous conclusion that 
this avenue of research is currently not being pursued at all within the FinSynBio program.  
It is hardly surprising that synthetic biology has garnered such levels of interest. The 
technology has the potential to solve or at least assist in solving many of the greatest 
challenges faced by our modern societies, such as the production of renewable sources of 
energy24 or affordable medicaments25 to name but two. In economic terms, it has the 
potential to improve total welfare.26 Therefore it is imperative to ensure SynBio is given the 
opportunity to address these issues, which in turn requires a systemic approach that ensures 
its economic viability as a technology. This is the primary objective of this thesis, 
consequently setting it in the “pragmatist-efficient” position of biotechnological patent 
theory.27 Attaining this objective requires an understanding of the effects of our current 
European IPR systems, both in legislation and in practice, on that viability. If the effects are 
negative, i.e. such that they reduce the viability of the technology, it is necessary to amend 
those systems. For reasons that will be explained shortly, this thesis will focus on the patent 
system. 
                                                 
17 OECD SynBio Report 2014, p. 93–115 
18 Opinion on Synthetic Biology I. 
19 Opinion on Synthetic Biology II. 
20 Opinion on Synthetic Biology III. 
21 Opinion on Synthetic Biology I, p. 54. 
22 FinSynBio Ohjelmamuistio, 3.3., p. 4. 
23 FinSynBio Ohjelmaesite, Rahoitettavat hankkeet, p. 5. 
24 Selgelid & Evans 2015, p. 8. 
25 Weber & Fussenegger 2012, 25. 
26 See e.g.: Motta 2004, p. 18–22 for a definition of this concept. 
27 See e.g.: Stazi 2015, p. 50–52 for a description of this theoretical position, as well as opposing views. 
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1.2. Regulating emerging technologies 
It is not always certain how authorities should adapt their legislative and regulatory systems 
to take into account the issues raised by such novel technologies as synthetic biology. It can 
be argued that as the developmental pace of new technologies increases, it is often so that 
the previous framework of governance is in some way unsuitable to the new technological 
state of affairs, requiring constant legislative changes to adapt to the new situation. Marchant 
refers to this as the pacing problem, which he argues is a result of a static view of society 
and technology instead of a dynamic one, leading to the diminished capability of legal 
institutions, such as the legislature, regulators and courts, to adjust to new challenges.28 If 
improperly managed, the mismatch caused by the pacing problem may result in the emerging 
technology becoming legally and/or economically unviable.29 
One way to account for technological changes would be to construct the regulatory 
instruments in a technology-neutral manner, resulting in a system of governance that does 
not discriminate between different technologies, nor does it become obsolete when faced 
with technological advancement. The global patent system has adopted this approach of 
technology neutrality30, as exemplified by Article 52(1) of the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) and Article 27(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement). This approach is not without its critics. Bennett Moses argues 
that neutral drafting techniques are inherently limited, especially in situations in which they 
merely ensure non-discrimination at the cost of efficiency.31 In a similar vein, Claudia 
Schmidt concludes that ensuring efficiency in IPR systems requires some level of 
differentiation between technologies.32 Burk and Lemley go even further by stating that this 
is the de facto reality of patent law, as in practice, patent systems are anything but technology 
neutral.33 In order to provide an answer to this dichotomy, it is necessary to analyze whether 
the current European patent system offers efficient solutions to the issues raised by synthetic 
biology. This very pursuit constitutes the first step of inquiry in this thesis. 
If we assume that synthetic biology does indeed exhibit a potential pacing problem that 
technology-neutral drafting techniques are unable to manage, the second logical step in such 
                                                 
28 Marchant 2011, p. 23. 
29 Idem., p. 25. 
30 van den Belt 2014, p. 25–26. 
31 Bennett Moses 2007, p. 274. 
32 Schmidt, C 2011, p. 55. 
33 Burk & Lemley 2003, p. 9. 
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an inquiry is to determine a course of action that would ameliorate any such 
incompatibilities. This necessitates an understanding of the incentive structures of the 
innovators themselves. Assuming that Marchant is correct about the risks posed by the 
pacing problem, should one attempt to resolve the problem ex post on a case by case basis, 
or should one endeavor to construct some coherent ex ante framework to guide the work of 
legislators, regulators, and adjudicators?  
Scholarly opinion would strongly seem to favor the latter. Minssen et al. have noted that due 
to the increasing complexity of the legal issues generated by synthetic biology IPRs, an ex 
ante approach to deal with foreseeable problems is mandated.34 Mandel has warned against 
dealing with such issues ex post, instead advocating “an iterative process at early stages of 
technological development and commercialization”35. This system consists of adopting an 
initial framework of governance, followed by data collection, evaluation and modification 
of the framework.36 As synthetic biology is still in its nascence as a technology37, it possible 
to affect its developmental course in this way. Following Mandel’s recommendation, the 
second step of this inquiry is to determine what such an ex ante framework of synthetic 
biology IPR governance should be.  
One question remains: how far should one go in creating such a framework? In their 
commentary, Ludlow et al. have opined that when faced with a pacing problem, wholesale 
changes to systems of governance are unlikely to succeed.38 Following this caveat creates 
an additional criterion for any proposed framework of synthetic biology IPR governance: 
simplicity.  A proactive approach that can be enacted through minor legislative, regulatory, 
institutional or judicial changes, or even entirely non-institutional means, is preferred. Such 
methods are also more amenable to the subsequent modifications required in Mandel’s 
model. A vital boundary condition is to ensure that the basic structure of the patent system, 
such as technology neutrality, is not extended beyond what is absolutely necessary.  
1.3. Research questions 
The discussion in the preceding section serves as a conceptual outline for the research 
questions of this thesis. As a reminder, the first step of inquiry is to determine whether 
                                                 
34 Minssen et al. 2015, p. 237. 
35 Mandel 2009, p. 89. 
36 Idem., p. 89. 
37 Mandel & Marchant 2014, p. 156. 
38 Ludlow et al. 2015, p. 161. 
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synthetic biology as a technology is somehow ill-suited for the existing forms of IP 
governance and management in Europe. This general question can be subdivided into a set 
of more specific research questions. The following listing is for illustrative purposes only, 
not intended to be taken as arising ex nihilo. The provenance of these interconnected issues 
will become evident in the following chapters of this work.  
Is synthetic biology a special case? The first step of inquiry must build upon a solid 
understanding of the technology itself, what its current developmental state is, what types of 
actors exist within the synthetic biology research community, and what types of IPR 
management practices that community has adopted.  
How does synthetic biology relate to European patent law? A fundamental starting point in 
any prescriptive inquiry is to establish what the current state of affairs is. Given the topic at 
hand, the most important question is how synthetic biology inventions fit into the current 
European patent system. This requires a basic understanding of the relevant European 
legislation and agreements, what specific issues arise in the interpretation of those sources 
of law, and what the actual state the technology is in terms of patents granted. 
What is the purpose of patent protection?  To determine whether the European patent system 
operates acceptably well in relation to synthetic biology, it is necessary to have some 
standard of measurement.  Developing such a standard requires an understanding of the 
underlying purpose of patent protection. If modifications to the patent system are warranted, 
they will be compared to the existing system in relation to the same standard. 
Patent fragmentation and overlap. As with other forms of biotechnology, synthetic biology 
is subject to high levels of patenting.39 A single gene may be subject to several patents40, and 
the research tools required to study and modify it might be proprietary as well41. Given that 
any one of the patent holders can potentially block the development of new innovations that 
are based on prior ones, does this result in the current patent system generating suboptimal 
outcomes? If so, does this affect the development of synthetic biology innovations? 
Answering these questions requires an analysis on the potential of synthetic biology to 
exhibit such problems. If it does, it is necessary to determine the factors that contribute to it. 
                                                 
39 Kumar & Rai 2007, p. 1751–1762. 
40 Merz & Cho 2005, p. 205. 
41 Wang 2008, p. 253. 
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Transaction costs. Assuming that synthetic biology does suffer from a fragmented patent 
landscape, how does this affect the various transaction costs involved in the research and 
development (R&D) and commercialization of innovations within the field? This requires 
determining what types of transaction costs are relevant and what their likely effects are. 
Collective action. Assuming that synthetic biology exhibits fragmentation and high levels of 
detrimental transaction costs, it is necessary to determine whether those issues can be 
sufficiently resolved by market forces operating in line with the current patent system. This 
requires an understanding of the incentive structures of the market actors involved in 
synthetic biology development. 
Provided that synthetic biology exhibits the aforementioned problems, the second stage of 
inquiry is to construct a framework of governance that addresses those issues in an efficient 
manner. The analysis conducted in the previous stage of inquiry provides the necessary 
backdrop for this process. Because of the limitations arising from the necessity of a relatively 
simple solution, it is not possible to construct a novel sui generis form of IPR protection that 
would replace the patent system in its entirety. Instead, a variety of existing solutions or 
novel solutions that are broadly in line with current patent legislation are be analyzed and 
addressed, with the objective of finding a combination that best ensures the functionality of 
both synthetic biology and the patent system. The final product of this part of the inquiry 
consists of concrete policy and legislative suggestions. 
1.4. Demarcation  
Providing an exhaustive answer to the full spectrum of all possible SynBio IPR concerns 
requires an analysis far too broad to fit within this work. Instead, the primary emphasis will 
be on the efficiency of European patenting system and patent practices in synthetic biology. 
The European dimension means that legislation and court decisions from other countries 
and institutions are utilized for comparative purposes, but the definite emphasis is on Europe 
as a whole. This results in the highlighting of the European Patent Convention as well as EU 
legislation, with some minor references to national law. 
As synthetic biology has the potential to create new lifeforms or redesign existing ones, it 
has generated a great deal of interest in both bioethics42 and biosecurity.43 After all, the 
editing and patenting of organisms and their constituent genetic material is one of the major 
                                                 
42 See e.g.: Boldt 2016, passim for an overview of the bioethical debate. 
43 See e.g.: Winter 2015 passim for an overview of the biosafety debate. 
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topics in current bioethics.44 As for biosafety, synthetic biology shares a definite legislative 
boundary with existing European GMO regulations.45 While both these issues do have 
dimensions in IP law, they are not central to it, especially given that the emphasis of this 
work is on efficiency. Consequently, neither topic will be discussed in this work. The nature 
of the technology, as well as the aforementioned economic emphasis results in questions 
relating to fundamental rights being omitted. While highly important, they require an entirely 
different approach. 
Emphasizing patent law will exclude any broad discussions on issues such as DNA 
copyright. The emphasis on patent law is justified by the fact that, despite attempts, copyright 
authorities have yet to allow the extension of copyright to DNA sequences.46 A second 
justification lies in the fact that creators of SynBio applications seeking proprietary forms of 
IPR protection have done so by applying for patents.47 This thesis will include some minor 
references to DNA copyright, but only for the purposes of illustrating some of the conceptual 
difficulties inherent in synthetic biology.  
Even though it is conceivable that synthetic biology inventions could include synthetic 
alterations to the genomes of humans and animals48, the emphasis on synthetic biology 
means that similar issues raised in other fields of European biotechnology patenting 
scholarship are consciously omitted from discussion.  Addressing them would require an 
extensive discussion on issues that are highly complex in their own right, such as germ-line 
modifications, cloning, and the patentability of embryos.49 These issues are not specific to 
the efficiency of the European patent system in relation to synthetic biology. 
1.5. Field of law, methodology, and sources 
Given the aims of this thesis, the general field of law most relevant to it is intellectual 
property law, with a special emphasis on European patent law. Patent law is primarily 
concerned with the questions of what can be patented, how a patent is granted, and what the 
ensuing legal effects of patents are. The period of exclusivity following the granting of a 
                                                 
44 See e.g.: Stazi 2015, p. 49–56; Brody 2007, passim. 
45 Douglas & Stemerding 2014, p. 7–9. 
46 See e.g.: Holman et al. 2016, passim. N.B.: This issue has not been similarly raised in Europe, presumably 
due to the fact that full copyright protection in Europe is automated.   
47 See e.g.: Nature SynBio Patent Grants 2015, p. 822. 
48 See e.g.: Frow & Calvert 2013, p. 37, in which professionals within the field discussed the potential of 
synthetic biology to develop lava lamps made of color-changing mice, television-tortoise hybrids, and 
miniature fighting dinosaurs. 
49 See e.g.: Stazi 2015, passim for a thorough introduction to these topics. 
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patent might considerably improve the market power of the patentee50, which naturally 
results in a reduction of competition in the relevant market. Because of the interrelatedness 
of innovation, market power, and competition, any attempt to address these issues cannot 
hope to succeed without some elements of competition law.51 Both the European scope of 
the patents discussed as well as the harmonized nature of competition law mandates the 
inclusion of general EU law. 
The methodologies of legal research adopted in this thesis seek to provide a means of 
addressing the constituent parts of its objective, namely efficiency and European patent law. 
In this respect, the two steps of inquiry raise an important epistemological point: the first 
point of inquiry is inherently descriptive, whereas the second one requires a formulation of 
normative statements.  In such contexts, one is well to be reminded of Hume’s guillotine, 
which states that normative statements do not follow directly from descriptive statements, 
or more simply put: “there is no ‘ought’ from ‘is’”52. Ensuring the validity of the arguments 
contained herein requires a methodological approach in which the descriptive nature of 
patents in synthetic biology is demarcated from the normative proposals. The descriptive 
section of this thesis is built upon common approaches in Nordic jurisprudence, namely legal 
dogmatics, comparative law and the economic analysis of law. The normative statements 
formulated in the latter part of this thesis rely primarily on law and economics. 
The reason for including an economical perspective is that the analytic study of optimal 
efficiency is a long-established sector of welfare economics53, making it the most suitable 
candidate for any such endeavor. It also provides this inquiry with the requisite tools to 
answer a large portion of the specific research questions outlined in chapter 1.3., such as the 
purpose of the patent system and the nature of the intellectual property problems engendered 
within synthetic biology. Building on a set of underlying assumptions, the economic analysis 
of law also allows the formulation of prescriptive policy solutions without falling victim to 
Hume’s guillotine. The validity of any such suggestions is contingent on the legitimacy of 
the underlying assumptions employed by the economic model.54 As the aim is to improve 
welfare through ensuring the viability of synthetic biology, the variety of economics used is 
welfare economics,  an approach that seeks the maximization of aggregate welfare through 
                                                 
50 Landes & Posner 1981, p. 943. 
51 See e.g.: Anderman 2011 p. 105–128 on the interface of EU competition law and IP law. 
52 Tontti 1998, p. 35–36. 
53 Motta 2004, p. 18. 
54 See: Appendix 1 for the discussion on the assumptions used in this thesis. 
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ensuring optimal efficiency.55 This is the fundamental starting point for creating a standard 
of efficiency for the patent system, both in evaluating its potential problems and in creating 
proposals for patent policy and de lege ferenda that improve upon them. The assumptions 
entailed by welfare economics also result in several criteria of falsification for both the 
descriptive and normative analysis, adding an element of the Popperian scientific method56 
which often is omitted from legal analyses. 
Legal dogmatics concerns itself with the systematization and interpretation of existing legal 
norms.57 The tradition of legal dogmatics that will be evidenced in this work is an applied 
version of Aarino’s neorealistic approach.58 It will be the method of choice for identifying 
and interpreting the existing norms of European patent law. However, the use of legal 
dogmatics will be limited to pure description, as it does not allow for the creation of the 
types of normative proposals that this thesis is aiming for, which are fundamentally based 
on the economics of innovation. 
A minor comparative approach is also called for. Most of the research in synthetic biology 
has taken place in the United States of America.59 Consequently, a large segment of the 
academic literature pertaining to the legal and economic aspects of synthetic biology are of 
American origin. This approach is also justified by the fact that certain aspects of European 
and US patent law have been harmonized through the 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). However, there are some important 
differences between the European and US systems which limit the use of comparison as a 
normative tool. The systems have different ways of managing the tension between the pro-
innovative but anti-competitive aspects of patents. The United States favors an IPR-friendly 
approach, whereas the European system is more geared towards ensuring competition.60   
The sources for this thesis consist primarily of journal articles in both patent law and law & 
economics journals, as well as monographs on such issues. Due to the difference in the pace 
of development within the field, the primary sources on SynBio patent economics are mostly 
of American origin, whereas the newer literature is primarily European. In regards to the 
biotechnological source literature, a concentrated effort has been made to utilize sources of 
                                                 
55 See e.g.: Hicks 1939, p. 698–712 for an overview of the foundations of welfare economics. 
56 See e.g.: Blaug 1994, p. 109 regarding the importance of falsifiability criteria in economics. 
57 Hirvonen 2011, p. 25–26. 
58 Aarnio 1997, p. 49–52.  
59 Oldham et al. 2012, p. 6. 
60 Tudor 2012, p. 225 
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the highest possible quality, such as recent publications in the journals Nature and Science. 
Other such citations are based on highly-esteemed and widely used reference manuals, which 
supplement these articles by providing necessary background information regarding the 
basics of molecular biosciences.  
1.6. Background concepts 
1.6.1. Upstream and downstream patents 
Modern biotechnological innovation can be conceptually divided into three stages: basic 
research or initial innovation, follow-on research, and commercialization.61. It is often so 
that each of the three stages requires both inventions from the preceding stage and older 
innovations from the same stage as inputs.62 Especially in rapidly developing fields, such as 
biotechnology, such preceding inventions may still fall under patent protection. This results 
in a hierarchy of patents, in which innovators must obtain licenses for patented inventions in 
order to develop their own invention. This allows for a way to describe the contents of this 
hierarchy as upstream patents and downstream patents.  
Holman offers a generalized definition of upstream patents as “patents that claim 
technologies associated with basic and early stage research and development, as opposed to 
patents covering ‘downstream’ commercial products”63. Resnik describes upstream patents 
as those vital for the development of a multitude of other inventions, which in turn may be 
upstream inventions for future applications.64 Resnik cites the example of a transistor being 
an upstream invention of a microchip, which in turn might be an upstream invention in a 
downstream commercial product, such as a mobile phone.65  
1.6.2. Complementary, substitute, blocking and essential patents 
Complements and substitutes are general economic concepts that have been extended to 
cover aspects of patent law. Complementary goods are goods that have little to no use or 
value unless coupled with some other commodity66, such as cars and tires. Substitute goods 
are goods which can be used as replacements for each other67, such as butter and margarine. 
                                                 
61 Wang 2008, p. 266. 
62 Idem. p. 261. 
63 Holman 2006, p. 629. 
64 Resnik 2003, in footnote 22. 
65 Idem. 
66 Cooter & Ulen 2004, p. 182 
67 Posner 2003, p. 43. 
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In patent law, complementary is evident when a new invention requires the integration of 
two or more inventions as its inputs, with each of those specific inventions being 
indispensable in the development of the downstream invention. Patents for such upstream 
inventions are appropriately called complementary patents.68 Substitution is possible when 
two or more inventions may be used as replacements for each other, with only one of the 
many substitute technologies being necessary for the development of the downstream 
invention. Concordantly, patents for such technologies are called substitute patents.69 
When attempting to acquire licenses for complementary patents, it may be the case that one 
of the patentees refuses to license their invention. If the upstream patents are truly 
complementary, this means that the development of any new technology reliant on such 
patents will be blocked. Such patents are called blocking patents.70 One additional caveat is 
necessary. The relevant literature generally considers the terms ‘essential patent’ and 
‘blocking patent’ to be synonyms.71 European legislative text operates under a similar 
definition, but distinguishes between patents for a) technologies that are essential for the 
creation of a product and b) those that are essential for conforming to a technological 
standard.72 For reasons of clarity, this thesis will follow the European legislative distinction, 
with essential patent denoting the former and standard-essential patent denoting the latter. 
1.6.3. Regarding economic concepts 
As stated in the methodology section, this thesis relies heavily on economic analysis. Such 
an approach inherently requires a substantial discussion on the underlying assumptions and 
concepts that come with any attempt at the economic analysis of law. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the most important of these are rational choice theory and efficiency. However, 
a full definition and justification of these concepts would result in a digressionary segment 
of considerable length. Including such a segment into this introduction would distract the 
reader from the fundamental aims of this work, resulting in poor legibility. That does not 
mean that a proper analysis on such important economic concepts is omitted. The discussion 
relating to the aforementioned concepts can be found in Appendix 1 of this thesis.  
                                                 
68 Schmidt, K. 2014, p. 68. 
69 WIPO Patent Pools Analysis, p. 4, Section II.a.8. 
70 Shapiro 2001, p. 120. 
71 See e.g.: Motta 2004, p. 206; Shapiro 2001, p. 134. 
72 See e.g.: TTA Guidelines, para. 252. 
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1.7. Structure of proceedings 
The general assumption in this thesis is that the reader is moderately well versed in the basic 
structure of patent law; its primary focus is on the law and economics of patents. Chapters 
and sections detailing the norm structure of the European patent system are consequently 
brief, with the focus being on how the norms relate to synthetic biology. The structure 
broadly follows the order of the research questions. However, the interconnectedness of 
those questions means that they cannot be discussed entirely separately. This thesis seeks to 
adopt a more logical way of discussing the issues, allowing the reader to follow the text 
without undue complications, but which results in the answering of the research questions. 
The second and third chapters are the main descriptive chapters of this thesis. The second 
chapter offers an introduction to the technology of synthetic biology. This chapter seeks to 
answer the question of why synthetic biology is a special case. After reading that chapter, it 
is hoped that the reader understands the general nature of the technology, what its potential 
and limitations are, how it relates to existing forms of intellectual property protection, as 
well as how the practitioners within the field view IPR protection. The third chapter seeks 
to set synthetic biology firmly in the existing framework of European patent law, with a 
special emphasis on the EPC. This chapter seeks to address the issue of the patentability of 
synthetic biology. In addition, this chapter seeks to outline some issues that synthetic biology 
might face when interpreted through EU and EPO case law. 
The fourth chapter consist of patent economics. The first part of this chapter aims to provide 
both a descriptive economic analysis of biotechnological patenting in general and synthetic 
biology in particular. The objective is to introduce the reader to the economic rationale of 
patents, as well as to explain why synthetic biology patenting may result in fragmentation 
and overlap, as well as increased transaction costs. The fifth chapter continues this analysis, 
seeking a general outline for normative solutions to these problems, seeking to construct the 
normative criterion used to evaluate the efficacy of the patent system.  The sixth chapter 
centers on a discussion on the tools that the free market, patent policymakers, and legislators 
have at their disposal to enact the normative logic of the previous chapter. The first part of 
the sixth chapter examines the efficacy of the free-market tools and their optimally 
construction. The latter part of the chapter is centered on what changes to existing policy 
and law are required for solving the problems outlined in the previous chapters.  
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2. Synthetic biology as a technology 
2.1. A conceptual understanding 
Synthetic biology (SynBio) seeks to combine the innovations of biotechnology with 
approaches adopted from fields such as electrical and semiconductor engineering73, 
computer and software engineering74, and nanotechnology.75 The fundamental aim of this 
technology is to standardize biological systems into discrete units with clearly defined and 
predictable qualities, thus allowing the creation of functional designer devices and novel 
biological systems from a set of standardized and modular constituent parts.76 Because of 
the cross-disciplinary nature of synthetic biology, it is difficult to define in exact terms. 
While undoubtedly an extension of current practices in biotechnology, many commenters 
have highlighted the difficulty of differentiating between synthetic biology and other related 
disciplines, such as genetic and metabolic engineering.77 Some general idea of what makes 
synthetic biology unique can gained through comparing it to its technological predecessors. 
The connection to biotechnology, especially recombinant DNA technology, arises from the 
fact that synthetic biologists utilize DNA and other biological substances as their primary 
source materials78, which are then modified and edited to suit their needs. However, the 
addition of engineering principles differentiates it from previous forms of biotechnology. 
The key difference between the aforementioned rDNA technologies and synthetic biology 
is that the former results in genetically altered variants of existing organisms, whereas 
synthetic biology allows for the rational creation and design of entirely new organisms with 
properties that do not currently exist in nature.79 The engineering principles of modularity 
and standardization invite analogies to semiconductor and computer technologies, in which 
a more complicated system is constructed of standardized parts.80 The link with software lies 
in the fact that assembling such modular parts into devices and systems is an inherently 
creative endeavor, with various ways of assembling standardized constituent parts that 
results in a system that performs a specific task.81 Synthetic biology relates to 
                                                 
73 Dutfield 2012, p. 125. 
74 Torrance 2010, p. 635–636. 
75 Torgersen & Schmidt 2013, p. 47. 
76 Weber & Fussenegger 2012, p. 21.  
77 See e.g.: Fernandez y Brañas 2014, p. 188–189. 
78 Mandel & Marchant 2014, p.159. 
79 Schmidt, J. 2016, p. 15. 
80 Dutfield 2012, p. 125. 
81 Agovic 2014, p. 103. 
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nanotechnology through similar objectives in constructing molecular mechanical devices 
that operate independently. The difference between the approaches is that in synthetic 
biology, the devices constructed are of a fundamentally biological nature.82 
Many of the aforementioned precursors of synthetic biology, such as the semiconductor 
industry, are regarded as being a complex technologies.83 The nature of this complexity lies 
in the fact in such technologies, downstream inventions contain multiple separately 
patentable (or indeed, patented) elements.84 The complexity of a given technology also 
indicates that technological development in the field is dependent on upstream innovations, 
with each subsequent invention resulting from what is inherently a cumulative process of 
research and development.85 This can be contrasted with more traditional discrete 
technologies, in which an invention combines relatively few patentable elements.86 A 
commonly used example of the latter is a pharmaceutical compound.87 The shared 
underlying idea of having multiple patented technologies as inputs for subsequent innovation 
results in the inextricable interrelatedness of the previously mentioned concepts of complex 
technologies, cumulative innovation, complementarity, and upstream patenting. As a 
combination of multiple complex technologies, synthetic biology could even be described 
as a ‘hypercomplex’ or ‘metacomplex’ technology. 
2.1.1. Definitions for synthetic biology 
The previous outline provides some notion of what makes synthetic biology unique. 
However, a generalized concept is insufficient for creating a functional system of intellectual 
property governance for such a technology, as it would be impossible to determine which 
issues function acceptably well within existing IP systems and which issues require 
genuinely novel solutions. Despite a great deal of academic debate, no wide consensus exists 
on such a definition.88 In such a situation, it would normally be sensible to adopt the 
definition constructed by an institutional entity that has the power to effect legislative and 
regulatory change. Such definitions do exist. A pertinent example would be the following 
definition adopted by the European Union: 
                                                 
82 Koepsell 2014, p. 46–49. 
83 von Graevenitz et al. 2011, p. 9. 
84 Cohen et al. 2000, p. 9. 
85 Idem. p. 19. 
86 Idem., p. 9. 
87 von Graevenitz et al. 2011, p. 9. 
88 Oldham et al. 2012, p. 3. 
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“Synthetic biology is the application of science, technology and engineering to 
facilitate and accelerate the design, manufacture and/or modification of genetic 
materials in living organisms.”89 
This definition, while brief, is too general to effectively distinguish synthetic biology from 
other forms of biotechnology. The co-founder of synthetic biology, Timothy S. Gardner, has 
criticized this trend towards overly broad definitions which increase the risk of conflating 
synthetic biology with more traditional biotechnology, therefore robbing the former of its 
unique characteristics. This may hamper any regulatory efforts targeted specifically towards 
the creation of a constructive framework for synthetic biology.90 Gardner calls for a return 
to the foundational idea of SynBio, namely “the standardization and abstraction of biological 
components”91. Another way to resolve the issue is to view synthetic biology as a collection 
of broadly similar approaches. One such definition is offered by Markus Schmidt, who 
divides SynBio into the subfields of: 1) DNA synthesis, 2) design of DNA-based biological 
circuits, 3) minimal genome design, 4) protocell development, and 5) xenobiology.92 
The focus of this thesis will be on the so-called bioparts approach, which combines elements 
2 and 3 of Schmidt’s definition with the underlying rationale of Gardner’s general definition. 
With this in mind, it is necessary to give an operational definition of synthetic biology for 
the purposes of this thesis. The definition given below is a combination of the applicable 
parts of the three definitions discussed above: 
Synthetic biology is the science of the standardization and abstraction of biological 
material through the utilization of engineering principles. Such biological material 
may be synthetically constructed or derived from naturally occurring sources. One of 
the subfields of this general endeavor is the formation of a hierarchy of 
interchangeable, modular and discrete bioparts, devices and systems (bioparts 
approach). These elements are implemented in a chassis, which subsequently 
performs a biological function. 
                                                 
89 Opinion on Synthetic Biology I, p. 30. 
90 Gardner & Hawkins 2013, p. 871. 
91 Idem. p. 872. 
92 Schmidt M. 2011, p. 112–113. 
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2.1.2. Bioparts approach 
A full understanding of the definition given above requires a description of the bioparts 
approach. (Bio)parts93 are the semi-literal building blocks of this form of synthetic biology. 
The term is generally understood to mean a strand of synthetically designed DNA that 
encodes a biological function94, such as a synthetic gene that produces a synthetic protein. 
Such a DNA sequence may conceivably be either constructed de novo or be a modified 
variant of an existing DNA sequence created through recombinant DNA technology.95 A 
common analogy used to clarify the nature of bioparts is to compare them to biological Lego 
bricks.96 Devices are combinations of bioparts, which together perform some specific 
biological function that is of human definition and design.97 An example of a device is a 
combination of bioparts that can perform Boolean algebra, such as a biological XOR logic 
gate.98 Systems are combinations of devices and parts that perform actual tasks99, such as 
computation. As an example, through a combination of AND, XOR and OR biological logic 
gates100 (i.e. devices as defined above), it is possible to construct a biological system that has 
the same basic computational structure as a conventional computer.101 
In order to perform their functions and tasks, the aforementioned elements must be 
implemented in some biological system, most commonly a modified microbe such as 
Escherichia coli.102 The microbe in which the biosystems are implemented is called the 
chassis.103 The modifications to the chassis commonly consist of removing all extraneous 
genetic material that the microbe does not require to sustain itself, thus creating a minimal 
genome104, as well as making modifications to existing metabolic pathways105. 
                                                 
93 N.B. The literature is not consistent in its terminology, with variable use of the terms ‘part’, ‘biopart’ and 
‘biobrick’ (if in lower case) all denoting the same basic concept. For purposes of clarity, this thesis will refer 
to these components as ‘bioparts’, following the nomenclature of i.a. Winter 2016, p. 172. 
94 Baldwin et al. 2016, p. 20. 
95 N.B. Complementary DNA strands based on unmodified DNA/RNA, while not existing in nature, are 
generally not considered to be examples of synthetic biology, as they lack modular design. 
96 See e.g.: Winter 2016, p. 172. 
97 Baldwin et al. 2016, p. 20. 
98 See: Rubens et al. 2016, p. 5 for an example of a SynBio XOR gate device. 
99 Baldwin et al. 2016, p. 20. 
100 N.B.: Specifically a so-called binary full-adder. 
101 See: University of Seoul Project Page on how Korean students designed precisely such a system in the 
2012 iGEM competition. 
102 See e.g.: Khalil & Collins 2010 passim. 
103 Baldwin et al. 2015, p. 162. 
104 Selgelid & Evans 2015, p. 3. 
105 Opinion on Synthetic Biology II, p. 29–31. 
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2.2. Legal frames for synthetic biology IPs 
Being an outgrowth of several different technological traditions, synthetic biology is also 
unique in how it has the potential to combine different intellectual property rights.106 This 
leads to the following question: should synthetic biology primarily be viewed as an extension 
of biotechnology and other similar engineering fields into more creative ones, such as 
software engineering, or vice versa? Choosing either frame results in very different 
implications for IPR protection. Viewing synthetic biology as an extension of established 
biotechnology, such as rDNA technology, sets it squarely in the field of patent law. Another 
possibility would be to frame the issue in relation to either open source or proprietary 
software, in which the most relevant IP structure is copyright. Neither of these frames can 
be dismissed out of hand, it is necessary to analyze each of them separately.   
Possibly the simplest solution is to adopt a historical perspective, in which synthetic biology 
is viewed primarily as a form of “extreme genetic engineering”107. As a subfield of 
biotechnology, it shares many of features with its parent technology, such as various genetic 
engineering techniques.108 This choice of frame results in viewing synthetic biology solely 
through the lens of the existing system of biotechnological patent protection, as that is the 
IP instrument most relevant to its predecessor field.109 As stated in the introduction, this is 
the approach chosen in this thesis, which is justified by the aforementioned fact that patents 
are the de facto form of proprietary IP protection within SynBio.  
                                                 
106 Torrance & Kahl 2014, 221–228. 
107 ETC Group, Report on Synthetic Biology 2007, p. 4. 
108 Robienski & Simon 2014, p. 127–128. 
109 Baldwin et al. 2015, p. 137. 
Figure 1. The hierarchy of bioparts, devices and systems 
as implemented in a chassis.  
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It is worth noting that many applications of synthetic biology manage to sidestep some of 
the most contentious intellectual property issues in modern biotechnology.110 As synthetic 
biologists concern themselves with more or less synthetic constructs, they are not similarly 
subject to the worldwide debate regarding the patentability of isolated human DNA 
sequences and whether they should be considered inventions or discoveries.111 This is not to 
say that SynBio is free of all the problems plaguing traditional biotechnology. A great deal 
of legal-economic scholarship has been devoted to economically detrimental patenting 
practices in biotechnology, which may affect synthetic biology as well, possibly in an 
exacerbated form. An example of such a problem is overly broad patent applications, such 
as the European patent application by the J. Craig Venter Institute for synthetic biology tools 
relating to the creation of micro-organisms with minimal genomes.112  
If synthetic DNA is viewed as a coding medium for biological programs, it makes sense to 
compare it to software. This in turn raises the issue of copyright, which in most cases is the 
IPR de rigueur in that field.113 A common argument that advocates this frame is that writing 
and designing synthetic DNA sequences has an element of choice, which can only be 
described as artistic expression.114 In second, synthetic DNA may be used as a storage 
medium for materials which are undoubtedly copyrightable, such as creative works. As an 
example of the latter, research groups have encoded inter alia books115 audio files116, and 
even a computer operating system117 into DNA. These strands of synthetic DNA could 
conceivably be amplified using the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method, resulting in 
millions of strands of DNA118, which could subsequently be decoded into binary form and 
represented as audio, text or fully functional software. In such situations, it is easy to note 
the potential for a full-on collision of patentability and copyright. 
Despite the de lege lata solution that highlights the primacy of patents over copyright in 
biotechnology, the conceptual conflict of the examples given above is not without 
                                                 
110 OECD SynBio Report 2014, p. 96. 
111 See e.g.: Stazi 2015, p. 145–165 and 220–224 for overview of the legal debate in the US and Europe. 
112 EPO patent application EP 06825527, extension of WIPO patent WO2007047148. N.B.: the EPO 
Examining Division responsible for the application deemed it insufficient in terms of novelty, inventive step, 
and disclosure. The application was deemed withdrawn as of May 2012. See also: Fernandez y Brañas 2014, 
p. 191. 
113 See e.g.: Article 4 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 20 December 1996. 
114 Rai & Boyle 2007, p. 389–392. 
115 Church et al. 2012, p. 1628. 
116 Goldman et al. 2013, p. 77. 
117 Erlich & Zielinski 2017, p. 951.  
118 See e.g.: Glick et al. 2010, p. 108–117 for a description of how the PCR method functions. 
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importance. Multitudes of scholars have raised concerns that synthetic biology may be 
systemically incompatible with the current paradigm of IPR protection.119 Commentators 
such as Palombi have highlighted the possible need of creating a sui generis form of IPR 
protection for genetic sequences in general120, which would necessarily extend to synthetic 
biology as well. However, as stated in chapter 1.4., this thesis will not feature any extensive 
discussion on DNA copyright, nor will it adopt a constructivist approach for entirely novel 
sui generis models.  
2.3. The potential of synthetic biology 
Proponents of synthetic biology often highlight the transformational potential of the 
technology. Advocates such as Khalil and Collins have stated that while synthetic biology 
faces some daunting technological challenges, their resolution would lead to a situation in 
which the technology is limited “only by the imagination of researches and the number of 
societal problems and the applications that synthetic biology can resolve”121. This potential 
has led to intensive research efforts in various fields, three of which will be mentioned in 
this context. Arguably the most prominent and promising application of synthetic biology is 
in solving many issues that relate to human health.122 A second potential and highly 
researched application of synthetic biology is in developing renewable sources of bioenergy 
through the production of biofuels by synthetic microbes.123 A third field of study involves 
the creation of cellular computers.124 For the sake of brevity, only the first of these will be 
discussed in more detail. 
Researchers and scholars have outlined several different modalities in which synthetic 
biology may have a positive impact on human health. To this effect, van Passel et al. outline 
the following instances of synthetic biology that have some existing applications: the 
microbial production of drugs, fighting infections, the treatment of genetic disorders, sensing 
environmental pollutants, infection detection, cancer treatments, and the development of 
biohybrid materials that enhance drug administration.125 While undoubtedly interesting, a 
lengthy exposition on each of these applications falls well beyond the purpose of this thesis. 
                                                 
119 See e.g.: Minssen et al. 2015 passim; Thambisetty 2013 passim; Kumar & Rai 2007, p. 1748–1762. 
120 Palombi 2008, passim. 
121 Khalil & Collins 2010, p. 377. 
122 See e.g.: Henkel & Lüttke 2014, passim. 
123 See e.g.: Mandel & Marchant 2014, p. 165–169. 
124 See e.g.: Service 2013 passim. 
125 van Passel et al. 2014, p. 4–8. For a more thorough listing of the biomedical applications of synthetic 
biology, see: Weber & Fussenegger 2012 passim.  
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In this instance, an example of the microbial production of drugs is sufficient to give the 
reader some concept of the scientific and technical developments in the field. 
An oft-quoted breakthrough in this application of synthetic biology was the production of 
semi-synthetic artemisinin. Artemisinin forms the basis of the WHO-recommended 
treatment of malaria caused by the parasite P. falciparum, specifically in the form of 
artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs)126. Artemisinin was previously sourced 
exclusively through extracting it from the plant Artemisia annua, an important cash crop in 
many developing countries.127 Despite the drug having been produced on a non-profit basis 
by the pharmaceutical companies Novartis and Sanofi-Aventis, the cost of the drug (4-10$) 
was considered prohibitively high for patients in high-risk areas.128 In 2006, researchers from 
Amyris Biotechnologies combined a total of ten different genes sourced from bacteria, plants 
and yeasts into a modified S. cerevisiae-based chassis organism, more commonly known as 
Brewer’s yeast. This modified yeast produced high concentrations of a precursor of 
artemisinin through a semi-synthetic mevalonate pathway that converted acetyl coenzyme 
A into artemisinic acid129, which in turn could be chemically synthesized into artemisinin.130  
The reason why this was considered a triumph of synthetic biology instead of rDNA 
technology was primarily due to the scale of the genetic engineering. Ro et al. introduced a 
total of 10 genes131, compared to the single modifications more common in traditional 
applications of rDNA technology. In addition to the scale of the genetic material transferred, 
the researches made modifications to the metabolic pathways of the semisynthetic yeast that 
resulted in maximizing the yield of arteminisic acid and minimizing the production of 
cytotoxic compounds, such as artemisinic aldehyde.132 When utilizing the modified yeast, 
artemisinin production required roughly the same biomass as when sourced from A. annua, 
but with a significantly higher rate of production; 4-5 days instead of 8 months.133 
This example above should be taken with a grain of salt. It can be argued that it is not a true 
manifestation of synthetic biology, as it did not exhibit much in the way of standardization 
                                                 
126 WHO Malaria Guidelines 2015, passim. 
127 van den Belt 2014, p. 20. 
128 van Passel et al. 2013, p. 4. 
129 N.B.: the fact that the modified S. cerevisiae produced a precursor of artemisinin is what made the process 
semi-synthetic. A true biosynthetic process would have resulted in the production of artemisinin. See: 
Paddon & Keasling 2014, p. 364. 
130 Ro et al. 2006, p. 940–941. 
131 Idem. 
132 Paddon & Keasling 2014. p. 362.  
133 van Passel et al. 2014, p. 4. 
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or modularity in the genes transferred nor the chassis used.134 This skepticism should be 
extended to cover the field in general. Multiple commentators have noted that however high 
the promise of synthetic biology may be, it relies on the idea that biological material can be 
standardized. It might turn out that biology is inherently too chaotic and unpredictable to be 
categorized and modelled in a sensible way.135 Whether one chooses to take a skeptical or 
optimistic view of the prospects of synthetic biology, it is hard to deny that those prospects 
should be explored. It does require that we acknowledge that its high potential exists in 
combination with the unknown limits of how much engineering nature can accommodate. 
This translates to a high level of economic risk for anyone engaging in such research, which 
in turn requires economic incentives. In biotechnology, such incentives are often generated 
by the aforementioned intellectual property rights, especially patents.136  
2.4. SynBio inventions as property and commons 
The synthetic biology community is divided in its attitudes towards IPR protection. Unlike 
many fields of biotechnology, which have traditionally favored strong patent protection137, 
a large part of the research community involved in synthetic biology maintains a strong 
commitment to keeping the field as unhindered by IPRs as possible.138 This type of commons 
approach (commonly referred to as access to knowledge or A2K) is characterized by 
researchers such as Drew Endy and Tom Knight, who have sought to construct a communal 
system that allows for the free sharing of information between research initiatives, especially 
regarding upstream research.139 The commons model is embodied by the three inter-related 
institutions of the BioBricks Foundation, The Registry of Standard Biological Parts, and the 
iGEM competition.140 The commons approach is contrasted by institutions such as the 
aforementioned J. Craig Venter Institute, which have sought strong patent protections for 
their SynBio inventions, such as the synthetic chassis mycoplasma laboratorium described 
in the very first words of this thesis.141 This approach is henceforth referred to as the IP 
frame.142 What follows is a brief overview of these two models. 
                                                 
134 Kelle 2013, p. 1126. 
135 Kahn 2011, passim. 
136 Stazi 2015, p. 6. 
137 Baldwin et al. 2015, p. 137. 
138 Torrance 2010, p. 653. 
139 Calvert 2012, p. 175–176. 
140 Torrance 2010, p. 656–657. 
141 Van den Belt 2013, p. 90–93. 
142 See: van den Belt 2013, p. 90 for the nomenclature of IP vs. A2K in relation to SynBio used herein. 
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2.4.1. IP frame vs. A2K 
The IP frame in synthetic biology is in essence an extension of the current paradigm of the 
biotechnology industry in seeking strong proprietary IPRs for their inventions, which is 
especially visible in the patenting of genes.143As can be inferred from the previous 
paragraph, arguably the most famous proponent of the proprietary model of SynBio 
innovation is J. Craig Venter and the institutes and companies he is associated with, inter 
alia the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI), its predecessors, such as the now-defunct Institute 
of Genomic Research, as well as the company Synthetic Genomics Inc.144 The J. Craig 
Venter Institute began applying for patents for their research in 2006, with the applications 
covering 13 groupings of patents, including patents relating to the synthesis of genomes and 
genome fragments.145 In addition to JCVI and its affiliates, other companies active in SynBio 
development have also adopted an aggressive stance in pursuing patent protection, such as 
Sangamo BioSciences, who own the patent146 to certain methods pertaining to gene 
switches.147 Several universities also hold patents on synthetic biology technologies, among 
which are inventions which may be considered foundational for various approaches within 
the field.148 As illustrated by the examples above, the IP frame highlights the patenting of 
upstream technologies, resulting in subsequent innovation being at least partially dependent 
on acquiring licenses to such foundational patents.  
The A2K model consists of several different organizations and institutions, four of which 
will be described. The BioBricks Foundation is one of the pre-eminent advocates of the A2K 
approach in synthetic biology. The Foundation has sought to foster the development and 
adoption of a shared assembly standard for synthetic biology, the BioBrick™, originally 
developed by Tom Knight in 2003.149 The primary purpose of the standard is to ensure the 
modularity of bioparts, so that developers of new parts can be reasonably certain that their 
parts can be successfully combined with other existing parts.150 The essence of the BioBrick 
standard consist of each biopart ending with recognition sites for a specific set of three 
restriction enzymes. The biological processes of digestion and ligation at these sites connects 
                                                 
143 Calvert 2012, p. 174. 
144 van den Belt 2014, p. 31–33. 
145 Chan & Sulston 2010, p. 1.  
146 Patent US 6794136 B1: Iterative optimization in the design of binding proteins. 
147 Kumar & Rai 2007, p. 1754–1755. 
148 Idem.  p. 1752. 
149 Baldwin et al. 2015, p. 47. 
150 See: BioBricks Standard Assembly webpage. 
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BioBricks to each other in a standardized way.151 The BioBricks Foundation operates its 
own registry for BioBricks, to which anyone may freely contribute resources152 and 
conversely, utilize the resources added to this registry153. Such actions must conform to the 
BioBricks Public Agreement, which requires that both the users and contributors commit not 
to assert any patents, copyrights or data rights against the Foundation or any other users.154  
The BioBricks Foundation operates in close contact with the International Genetically 
Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition. The iGEM competition is considered to be one 
of the prime embodiments of the A2K ethos in synthetic biology. The competition is meant 
as a platform for teams consisting of high-school students, undergraduates and postgraduate 
students to tackle real-world problems by constructing biodevices and systems from a kit of 
approximately a thousand BioBricks.155 iGEM began in the academic year 2003–2004 as an 
independent activity period project organized by Tom Knight and Drew Endy, which has 
since grown to include over 200 teams from all parts the world.156 The bioparts, devices and 
systems developed during the previous competitions are part of an intellectual commons.157 
This allows for teams in each subsequent iGEM competition to build on the work done by 
previous teams. Many of the projects developed in the iGEM competition have led to 
publications in major scientific journals, such as the 2004 development of a bacterial 
photofilm by University of Texas at Austin resulting in an article in Nature.158  
The BioBricks developed in the iGEM competition are added to the Registry of Standard 
Biological Parts (SBP Registry)159, operated by MIT.160 This registry contains an open 
source collection of BioBricks of varying functions. In addition to the parts themselves, the 
registry contains data pertaining to the usage of the bioparts, along with resources for the 
synthesis and assembly of novel parts, devices, and systems.161 The economic impact of 
iGEM and its open-source ideology is best characterized by the fact that in the 2008 
                                                 
151 Baldwin et al. 2016, p. 48. 
152 BioBrick™ Contributor Agreement, section 1.  
153 BioBrick™ User Agreement, section 1. 
154 Idem. section 2.1.  
155 Baldwin et al. 2016, p. 120.  
156 Idem., p. 119–120. 
157 Van den Belt 2014, p. 30. 
158 Levaskaya et al. 2005, p. 441–442. 
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160 Bensaude Vincent 2013, p. 370. 
161 Idem. 
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competition alone, 1,500 parts were added to the SBP registry, the mere patenting of which 
would have cost an estimated 35 million US dollars.162 
One common critique levied towards both the open source initiatives above is that the parts 
developed by them are of relatively low quality, with insufficient metadata for the parts to 
be of use in developing proper scientific or commercial applications.163 This criticism has 
led inter alia to the creation of the International Open Facility Advancing Biotechnology 
project (BIOFAB), which is a collaboration between the US National Science Foundation, 
UC Berkeley and Stanford University that seeks to produce open source library of high-
quality standardized bioparts.164  
2.4.2. Commonalities and peculiarities 
It would be easy to overstate the differences between the IP and A2K models. In actual fact, 
the two models are in broad agreement over a variety of issues regarding SynBio IPRs. First, 
a shared consensus exists within advocates of both models regarding the patentability of 
downstream innovations, especially ones that are ripe for commercialization.165 The second 
commonality has to do with the shared view that certain aspects of basic SynBio 
infrastructure should be treated as part of the intellectual commons.166  The commons 
advocates claim that all research inputs, i.e. standards of interoperability and performance, 
design and testing methods, functional and non-functional fragments of DNA, performance 
data, and chassis, should constitute a commons. Advocates of the IP frame agree on most of 
these points, except for functional fragments of DNA, performance data, and redesigned 
chassis, which in varying degrees are considered subject to proprietary IP protection.167 The 
major point of contention lies in the patentability of functional fragments of DNA and 
minimal chassis microbes, which are the central components in the bioparts-approach of 
constructing synthetic devices and systems.168 This also explains the choice to concentrate 
on the issues arising these forms of upstream inventions. 
Many scholars have highlighted the fact that the seemingly competing A2K and IP frames 
might in actual fact be synergistic. Kumar and Rai note that combining the approaches allows 
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for proprietary IP to generate an influx of necessary venture capital into the field, while the 
unpatented space may mitigate some of the economic problems arising within the proprietary 
approach.169 Heller and Maurer argue that the production of bioparts through open source is 
the best solution, but if an open source approach is unable to do so, a proprietary biopart is 
societally preferable to having no part at all.170 As indicated by the examples above, the 
broad consensus among scholars of the field is that optimal levels of innovation require both 
a proprietary and commons approach. While many of the individual opinions of these 
scholars offer ample room for critique, such criticism is not possible in this work without 
expanding its scope considerably. As a result, the general scholarly consensus of the need of 
both proprietary innovations and A2K for the effective development of downstream 
development of SynBio applications is assumed as being valid.  
2.5. Responsible Reseach and Innovation 
Given overarching objective of this thesis is to ensure welfare, an approach that combines 
proprietary IP with A2K requires that the patenting of both upstream and downstream 
SynBio inventions is done in a manner that produces socio-economically beneficial 
outcomes.  This can be viewed as an instance of the broader concept of Responsible Research 
and Innovation (RRI). An operational definition of RRI given by von Schomberg is that it 
is “a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become 
mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability 
and societal desirability of the innovation proves and its marketable products”171.  
The concept of RRI is a very topical issue in both theoretical discussions on biotechnology 
patenting as well as actual contemporary IPR policy. As an example of the theoretical 
discussion; the re-evaluation of the current relationship between innovation and the greater 
societal good was a key point in the 2013 Manchester Manifesto, which was signed by a 
multitude of scholars in bioethics, law, and economics, including two Nobel laureates. The 
Manifesto highlights a multitude of structural issues arising from the current IP paradigm, 
especially the patent system, which result in fragmentation of IP, restrictive licensing 
practices, and various forms of increasing transaction costs.172  The Manifesto argues that 
these issues lead to the stifling of scientific progress, lower levels of innovation, and most 
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importantly for this thesis, decreased societal welfare.173  It ends with a call to reorganize 
our existing IP system and practices to better ensure the provision of public benefit and to 
facilitate scientific progress.174  
The importance of synthetic biology RRI in European innovation policy is evidenced by the 
fact that RRI has been adopted as a central facet of the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
strategy.175 Biotechnology in general was identified as one of six ‘key enabling technologies’ 
(KET) that has the potential of both improving the industrial and innovative capacities of the 
Union, as well as addressing various societal concerns and enhancing the quality of life.176 
Synthetic biology was listed as the very first subfield of biotechnology (BIOTEC 1) that 
warranted concentrated research and innovation actions within the Horizon 2020 program.177  
Based on the discussion above, it is easy to conclude that the necessity of RRI in synthetic 
biology is not only a matter of opinion, but also an institutional fact. As one of the 
fundamental purposes of RRI is to improve the quality of life, it is taken as a matter of course 
that an RRI approach in synthetic biology results in higher levels of aggregate welfare 
throughout the European Union. This creates an explicit link between the objectives of this 
thesis and ensuring RRI in synthetic biology. However, ensuring true RRI in relation to 
proprietary inventions of synthetic biology is not a straightforward matter. Following a 
similar line of reasoning as the authors of the Manchester Manifesto, Köning et al. highlight 
several issues in our current patent system relating to SynBio that may result in both societal 
and economic failures, thus jeopardizing the goals of responsible research and innovation. 
According to them, the development of RRI in synthetic biology may be hindered by 1) 
broad patent claims in fundamental parts or techniques, 2) patent thickets, and 3) a 
concentration of patents.178 As a result, a further analysis of these questions, as well as other 
closely related issues, is central for the purposes of this thesis. Before it is possible to delve 
into this line of questioning in detail, it is necessary to understand the general relationship 
of synthetic biology inventions and European patent law. Ensuring RRI through providing 
solutions to the aforementioned issues engendered by SynBio patents forms the basis of the 
discussion in Chapters 4–6 of this thesis.  
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3. Synthetic biology in European patent law 
3.1. European patent law 
Seemingly most of the discussions in the literature regarding the compatibility of synthetic 
biology with European patent law are based on generalized patent theory179, with relatively 
few scholars having analyzed the actual implications of substantive European patent law on 
synthetic biology.180 The purpose of this chapter is to provide some additional analysis to 
this effect. It also serves as a natural part of the overall aim of this thesis, as any 
incompatibility of substantive European patent and the technology itself may jeopardize the 
development of the technology. Identifying such problems is also of obvious importance in 
constructing an IP framework for synthetic biology. 
Article 118(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union181 (TFEU) warrants 
the creation of a system that ensures uniform protection for IPRs, including patents, 
throughout the internal market. This requirement and its historical antecedents have resulted 
in various attempts to harmonize patent protection within the European Union.182 While 
patent law has not been exhaustively harmonized in Europe, efforts to do so have resulted in 
a two-tiered system in which national patent law operates in tandem with a European 
framework.183 The most important component in the latter European dimension is the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 (the EPC, revised in the 
year 2000184). Article 4 of the EPC mandated the creation of an autonomous patent authority, 
the European Patent Office (EPO) to oversee the granting of European patents.  
A European patent offers a centralized patent prosecution system for all signatory nations of 
the EPC.185 However, a patent created in this way does not constitute a unified IPR in all the 
contracting nations. A European patent must be validated by the national patent authorities 
of the signatories of the EPC in which the patentee wishes to obtain patent protection for 
their invention, meaning that a European patent merely provides a unified pathway of patent 
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prosecution, which ultimately results a bundle of national patents.186 To this effect, EPC 
Article 2(2) states that once the European patent has been granted and validated in a given 
nation, it will be subject to the same conditions as a national patent, unless otherwise stated 
in the Convention. Among other things, this indicates that if the European patent expires due 
to non-payment of fees in one of the contracting states for which it has been granted and 
validated, this does not have any immediate effect on rights granted in other states.187 The 
most crucial example of the role of national law for the purposes of this analysis is EPC 
Article 64(3), which provides that infringing a European patent shall be dealt with in 
accordance to national law. 
Efforts to harmonize the European patent system have gone further. A major development 
in this respect took place in 2012, when the European parliament voted in favor of Council 
Regulations (EU) No 1257/2012188 on the creation of unitary patent protection (Unitary 
Patent Regulation), and No 1260/2012189 regarding the translation arrangements necessitated 
by such a unitary patent system. As the titles of these regulations would suggest, both 
concern the creation of unitary patent protection. According to Article 2(b) and (c) of the 
Unitary Patent Regulation, unitary patents are a form of European patent granted by the EPO, 
the granting of which follows the rules and procedures of the EPC. Compared to a traditional 
European patent, once granted, the unitary patent offers uniform patent protection that covers 
all the participating Member States, without the need for inter alia national validation.190 
The unitary patent has not quite come into existence yet. Article 18(2) of the Unitary Patent 
Regulation states that the regulation will come into effect after the ratification of the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA)191. The Unified Patent Court is a proposed 
forum that is open to all Member States of the European Union, although institutionally 
separate from it. As formulated in the UPC Agreement, the UPC provides a single forum for 
inter alia infringement cases (UPCA, Article 32), and revocation proceedings (UPCA 
Article 65) of European patents, both traditional and unitary (Article 1). In turn, the UPC 
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Agreement will become valid when the three conditions listed in the preamble are met.192 
As of 10 March 2017, this process still requires the ratification of the Agreement by Germany 
and the United Kingdom.193 
As a result, European patent law will soon consist of three functionally distinct forms of 
patents: national patents, traditional European patents and unitary European patents. 
However, the EPC will remain the paramount force of harmonization in substantive patent 
law. The reason for his is two-fold. First, as stated above, both forms of European patents 
are granted in accordance to the EPC. Second, the EPC has resulted in the de facto 
harmonization of central elements of substantive patent law, especially regarding the criteria 
of patentability.194 Because of its role as a primary source of substantive law throughout 
Europe, the main emphasis of the following sections of this chapter will be on the EPC and 
its interpretation. Before it is possible to concentrate on such matters, it is necessary to 
discuss the role of EU law on the patenting of SynBio inventions.  
3.2. Biotechnology in EU law 
Despite the fact that European patent law has traditionally been the remit of the EPC and 
EPO, the European Union has also had some success in harmonizing substantive patent law. 
Given the subject of this thesis, the most important example of such efforts is Directive 
98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, more commonly known as 
the Biotechnology Directive.195 The Biotechnology Directive was crucial in ensuring a 
unified European approach to various contentious issues that naturally arise from construing 
the substance matter of all life as a form of property.196 The criteria for patenting 
biotechnological inventions are contained in Article 3 of the Biotechnology Directive, which 
states that: 
1.   For the purposes of this Directive, inventions which are new, which involve an 
inventive step and which are susceptible of industrial application shall be patentable 
even if they concern a product consisting of or containing biological material or a 
process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used. 
                                                 
192 UPC Agreement (English version), p. 6, para. 15. 
193 UPC Ratification Details (EC) webpage. 
194 See e.g.: Kur & Dreier 2013, p. 88; Ellyne 2013, p. 147. 
195 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions (L 213/13). 
196 See e.g.: Stazi p. 192–195 for a description of the varying views of EU Member states regarding the 
Directive and its implications. 
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2.   Biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by 
means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously 
occurred in nature. 
Article 2 of the Biotechnology Directive defines biological material as any material 
containing genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a 
biological system. Given the definition of bioparts, devices, systems and chassis provided in 
section 2.1.2. of this thesis, it is clear that these SynBio components are biological material 
as meant in the Directive, which also results in their general classifiability as inventions. 
The Biotechnology Directive has important implications regarding the upstream inventions 
used in the creation of bioparts. As stated previously, bioparts often consist of modified 
forms of naturally existing DNA. As implied by Article 3(2), these naturally occurring 
sequences, if isolated, are considered patentable subject matter. The specific meaning of the 
word ‘isolated’ may be derived from Recital 21 of the preamble, in which the isolation of a 
naturally occurring element implies some form of “technical processes used to identify, 
purify and classify it and to reproduce it outside the human body, techniques which human 
beings alone are capable of putting into practice and which nature is incapable of 
accomplishing by itself”.197 This legislative approach allowing the patenting of isolated but 
naturally occurring genes of the human body caused a great furor during its legislative 
process and afterwards198, leading inter alia to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(ECJ) case The Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European parliament and Council199, which 
was set off by the Netherlands requested the annulment of the entire Directive by the 
Court.200 The ECJ did not accept the line of argumentation, viewing that sufficient 
safeguards of human dignity were in place.201 The approach adopted by the European 
legislator and ECJ can be contrasted with the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) 2013 ruling in 
the case Myriad v. Association of Molecular Pathology, in which the court ruled that 
naturally occurring sequences of DNA constitute non-patentable subject matter even if 
                                                 
197 See e.g.: Idem. p. 210–213 for a more thorough discussion on the topic. 
198 Idem.  p. 192–193. 
199 ECJ Netherlands v Parliament and Council (C-377/98), Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2001. 
200Application for annulment of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (OJ 1998 L 213); p. 13. 
201 ECJ Netherlands v Parliament and Council, para. 77. 
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isolated, although confirming the patentability of altered sequences of DNA, such as cDNA, 
as well as applications based on the knowledge of naturally occurring DNA.202 
Multiple patents have been granted for isolated natural genetic sequences in Europe.203 This 
raises the question of the effects of such patents on developing modified variants of gene 
sequences contained within the claims, such as is often done when designing new bioparts. 
A similar question applies to the relationship of patented bioparts in devices, patented 
devices in systems, et cetera. The crux of the matter can be boiled down the following three 
questions: 1) if based on a previously patented gene, how much does a biopart have to be 
modified in order for it to constitute an invention? 3) How far does the patent protection of 
a genetic sequence (e.g. a biopart) extend when combined into a system 2) When designing 
and constructing any such SynBio invention, can a SynBio innovator modify a patented gene 
or any combination thereof without the need to obtain a license for said patent(s), provided 
that the resulting biopart is sufficient different from the patented gene?  
The first question is partially answered within the preamble of the Directive, although not in 
a conclusive manner. Recital 25 provides that if a given genetic sequence overlaps with a 
patented one in a way which is not essential to the invention, the former sequence is to be 
considered as being independent of the latter in terms of patent law. Nowhere in the Directive 
nor its preparatory works is this criterion of essentiality explicitly clarified; Schertenlieb 
calls it “an unknown function”204. This issue is further compounded by recitals 22 and 23, 
the first of which states that the industrial application of a genetic sequence or partial 
sequence must be disclosed in the patent application. Recital 23 in turn states that DNA 
sequence without an indicated function contains no technical information, resulting in such 
sequences being unpatentable. However, the literature indicates that the function of a gene 
or gene fragment consists of its industrial applicability as disclosed in the patent application, 
whereas the essentiality of a section of a sequence to an invention is determined by its 
disclosed function.205 This allows the formulation of an answer to the first question: the 
modifications made must result in the biopart having a clearly identifiable function distinct 
from its patented input, although functionally irrelevant overlap can be safely ignored.  
The second question is partially addressed in the Directive itself, with Article 9 providing: 
                                                 
202 Supreme Court of the United States of America, case No. 12–398: Association of Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., of 13 June 2013, p. 10–18. 
203 See e.g.: Verbeure et al. 2006, passim.  
204 Schertenlieb 2003, p. 12. 
205 See e.g.: Díaz Pozo 2017, p. 113. 
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The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic 
information shall extend to all material, save as provided in Article 5(1)206, in which 
the product is incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained and 
performs its function. 
This provision implies that a patented biopart incorporated in a device207 maintains its 
proprietary nature, so long as the part in question ‘performs its function’. When does such a 
gene stop performing its function? The answer to this question was at the heart of the ECJ 
2010 judgement on the case Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra and Others. In its 
judgement, the ECJ determined that patent rights to certain proprietary EPSPS genes that 
generate a resistance to herbicide ‘Roundup’ in soy plants do not extend to the end products 
generated by that plant in which the gene no longer serves a function208, which in this specific 
instance was imported soy meal that contained the gene.209 Taken together, the 
aforementioned Article 9 and ECJ ruling indicate that the patent protection on a biopart 
extends all the way to the synthetic microbe that contains it.  As stated above, the function 
is fundamentally determined by the disclosure of industrial applicability. 
A key element in answering the third question lies in so-called experimental use exemptions, 
which broadly stated provide a form of ‘safe harbor’ for scientific research.210 Such 
exemptions have been adopted in certain elements of EU law, such as in Article 3(2–3) in 
Directive 2001/82/EC211 concerning veterinary medicinal products and 2001/83/EC212 
concerning human medicinal products, but current EU law does not prove a blanket solution 
for biotechnological patents.213 This is subject to change, as the Article 27(b) of the UPC 
Agreement states that patent rights do not apply to acts done for experimental purposes 
relating to the subject matter of the patented invention. As research exemptions have 
previously fallen within the scope of national law, resulting in varying solutions throughout 
Europe, it is unclear what this provision will entail in practice.214  
                                                 
206 N.B: Article 5(1) limits the patentability of the human body and mere discoveries of human genes. 
207 N.B.: Or following the hierarchy: a biodevice in a system or a system in a chassis. 
208 ECJ Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra and Others (C-428/08), Dispute, p. I 6798–6799, para. 15–21. 
209 Idem. Ruling, point 1, p. I 6814. 
210 Kur & Dreier 2013, p. 119–120. 
211 Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001, on the 
Community code relating to veterinary medicinal products (L311/1). 
212 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001, on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (L 311/67), as amended by Directive 
2004/27/EC of 31 March 2004 (L 136/34). 
213 Kupecz et al. 2015, p. 710. 
214 Idem. p. 715. 
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3.3. Patentable subject matter in the EPC 
The focus of this section will be on studying the potential issues raised when applying for a 
European patent for a SynBio invention. This requires an understanding of the criteria of 
patentability as detailed in Articles 52 and 53 of the EPC, as well as instances of relevant 
case law of the EPO Boards of Appeal. The first step in such a process is determining 
whether SynBio inventions generally are patentable subject-matter. This is not an entirely 
trivial question, as if one was to frame synthetic biology as a form of biological software as 
suggested in section 2.2., the answer might very well be no, as the current substantive law 
of the EPC generally prohibits the patenting of computer programs (EPC Art. 52(1)(c)).215 
After the general case of patentability of SynBio has been established, it is possible to 
concentrate on specific issues raised in EPO case law that have implications for the 
development of the technology. To this begin this line of questioning in earnest, Article 52 
of the EPC provides that: 
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application.  
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning 
of paragraph 1: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;  
(b) aesthetic creations;  
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or 
doing business, and programs for computers;  
(d) presentations of information.  
The concept of technology neutrality contained in Article 52(1) (“for any inventions, in all 
fields of technology”) indicates that inventions of synthetic biology should be considered 
patentable, provided that they are 1) novel, 2) non-obvious, and 3) industrially applicable. It 
is also crucial to note that the aforementioned Biotechnology Directive and its interpretations 
have had a major impact on the substantive law of the EPC. The Directive led to changes in 
the Implementing Regulations of the EPC, resulting in the implementation of the central 
provisions of the Directive as Part II, Chapter V of the Implementing Regulations.216 Rule 
26(1) of said Regulations specifies the relationship between the Implementing Regulations, 
                                                 
215 See e.g.: Hilty & Geiger 2011, p. 161–171 for a detailed discussion on the general topic. 
216 Kur & Dreier 2013, p. 125.
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the EPC, and the Biotechnology Directive. It states that the regular rules of patentability in 
the EPC will be applied and interpreted in accordance to Part II, Chapter V of the 
Regulations, with the Biotechnology Directive being a supplemental source for 
interpretation.  
In determining what constitutes a biotechnological invention, the EPC has adopted the 
definitions contained within the Biotechnology Directive.217 Rule 26(1) of the Implementing 
Regulations defines biotechnological inventions as inventions which concern a product 
consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological 
material is produced, processed or used. Rule 26(2) defines biological material as any 
material containing genetic information and capable of being reproduced in a biological 
system. Rule 26(6) defines a microbiological process as any process involving or performed 
upon or resulting in microbiological material. Given the definitions above, it can be safely 
stated that all of the elements contained in the bioparts approach can be construed as 
biotechnological inventions within the EPC system, as they consist of and produce biological 
material.218 In turn, that biological material is capable of being reproduced in a biological 
system, i.e. the chassis.219 As the chassis is typically a prokaryote, such as a modified variant 
of E. coli or S. cerevisiae220, any synthetic biology systems that are incorporated into such a 
chassis are necessarily microbiological processes as well. 
Prima facie it would seem that all the main components of the bioparts based approach of 
synthetic biology meet the criteria of biological inventions, consequently fitting the first 
requirements of patentable subject matter as meant by Article 52 of the EPC. Studies 
conducted by inter alia Rutz221 and Fernandez y Brañas222 also bear out this initial 
assumption: the EPO considers SynBio inventions patentable. It is now possible to examine 
the implications of the substantive law on the criteria of novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability on synthetic biology. As stated above, the following section specifically seeks 
to highlight potential problems that the established forms of interpreting the EPC might 
engender in synthetic biology. 
                                                 
217 Idem. p. 125. 
218 See: Section 3.2. of this thesis. 
219 Idem. 
220 Baldwin et al. 2015, p. 43. 
221 Rutz 2009, passim.  
222 Fernandez y Brañas 2014 passim, arriving at this conclusion in p. 197-198. 
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3.3.1. Novelty 
The general rule of evaluating novelty in the EPC can be found in Article 54, which states 
the following:  
(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the 
art.  
(2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public 
by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date 
of filing of the European patent application.  
The first step is determining novelty is to define what state of the art or prior art means in a 
given situation, followed by determining what part of the prior art is relevant and what the 
relevant part contains. After the prior art has been defined, the second step is to compare the 
new invention to aforementioned prior art. If they differ, the invention is considered novel.223  
While seemingly simple, the interpretation of this rule has become more complex in the case 
law of the EPO Boards of Appeal, which has some implications as to the patentability of 
SynBio inventions. The problem arises when trying to determine the scope of the state of the 
art in relation to knowledge that is not explicitly contained within the art, but that is to some 
extent implied by it.   
The established case law of the EPO Boards of Appeal state that an invention lacks novelty 
if its subject-matter is can be unambiguously and directly derived from prior art.224 In the 
case T 179/01 (Herbicide resistant plants/MONSANTO), the Technical Board of Appeal had 
to evaluate the implied relationship between DNA and proteins. In the case, the appellants 
argued that a prior publication indicating the likely relationship of a gene with a B. subtilis 
equivalent of an EPSPS protein destroyed the novelty of the isolated gene sequence claimed 
by the proprietor of the patent.225 As the central dogma of molecular biology states: DNA is 
transcripted into strands of mRNA, which contains the codons that are subsequently 
translated into proteins by tRNA and ribosomes.226 If read backwards, the aforementioned 
process means that if the primary structure of a protein is known, it is possible to infer the 
                                                 
223 EPO Case Law 2016, p. 69. 
224 EPO Case Law 2016, p. 102. 
225 EPO Technical Board of Appeal T 179/01 (Herbicide resistant plants/MONSANTO), Summary, XI, p. 
11–12. 
226 Crick 1958, p. 153. 
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sequence of the mRNA that encoded it, as well as that of the underlying exonal DNA.227 
This lead the board to consider the possibility of an “indirect proof of inherency”, in which 
knowledge of the structure of one molecule may still destroy the novelty of another 
molecule, despite the fact that they are structurally entirely dissimilar.228 The Board came to 
the conclusion that indirect proof of inherency is sufficient to remove novelty if the prior art 
provides “a clear, unambiguous and enabling lead to the inherent properties”229 of the 
patented genetic sequence or protein.  
This conclusion is important for the development of synthetic biology. If the structure of an 
entirely novel biopart may be clearly and unambiguously deduced from the prior art 
knowledge regarding the proteins it produces or the structure of existing metabolic pathways, 
it may imply that a large portion of any biopart is considered state of the art. This may 
possibly generate some strict boundary conditions for the patentability of simple bioparts. 
3.3.2. Inventive step 
Article 56 of the EPC states the following: 
An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the 
state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. 
In evaluating whether an invention is non-obvious, the EPO has adopted a three-point 
problem-and-solution approach, which consists of: 1) determining the ‘closest prior art’, 2) 
determining the nature of the ‘objective technical problem’ that the claimed invention seeks 
to solve, 3) Determining whether the purported invention, starting from the closest prior art 
and the objective technical problem, would have been obvious to the skilled person.230231 
The modular nature of bioparts raises an important question in relation to the third point in 
the problem-and-solution approach. As exemplified by the Artemisin research conducted by 
Ro et al., synthetic biologists often seek to develop new processes for the production of 
existing pharmaceutical compounds and biopharmaceuticals.232 If natural processes for the 
                                                 
227 N.B.: mRNA may contain 64 different codons, but they only translate to 22 amino acids, meaning that the 
process of backward deduction is limited. As an example, leucine is encoded by six different codons, 
meaning that six possible variations of DNA result in the same protein. See e.g.: Glick et al. 2010, p. 30. 
228 T 179/01, Reasons, point 12; p. 20. 
229 T 179/01, Reasons, point 13; p. 20–21. 
230 EPO Guidelines, Part G-VII, para. 5. 
231 N.B.: EPO Guidelines, Part G, Chapter VIII, paragraph 3, defines a ’skilled person’ as “a skilled 
practitioner in the relevant technology, possessing average knowledge and ability, and knowledgeable of the 
state of the art in that field”. 
232 See e.g.: van den Belt 2014, p. 3–4. 
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production of such compounds already exist, would their synthetic emulation entail some 
level of obviousness?  In its case T 2/83, the EPO Technical Board of Appeal stated that a 
course of action may be deemed obvious pursuant to Article 56 if a skilled person would 
have taken that action while expecting an advantage or improvement as result of it.233 This 
point was further clarified in T 0149/93, which explicitly stated that while a clearly 
predictable course of action is obvious, a reasonable expectation of success may render a 
purported invention obvious as well.234 Consequently, if a synthetic biopart emulates nature 
too closely, such as being a modularized version of a prior art gene constructed using a pre-
existing standards, it is likely to be considered obvious.  
However, the latter ruling raises another point: if the modular gene sequences responsible 
for the production of those compounds are considered prior art, would combining them and 
adding them into a chassis be considered obvious? This problem can be generalized to all 
bioparts. If the assembly of bioparts seeks to replicate some well-known process and the 
bioparts used are sufficiently modular, it implies that constructing a system or device based 
on those parts is relatively straightforward for the skilled person. In this vein, scholars, 
although grossly simplifying the matter, have compared bioparts and their assembly into 
devices to assembling Lego bricks.235 This may potentially result in situations in which 
downstream commercial applications are unpatentable by virtue of being obvious. In such a 
situation, upstream innovators would be incentivized to seek strong IPR protections at the 
level where they are likely to obtain them. This would logically make the patenting of 
bioparts more enticing, resulting in the solidification of upstream patenting as a necessary 
practice to recoup R&D costs. This could potentially exacerbate the problems faced by 
synthetic biology. Therefore it is imperative to design a solution for such a problem. 
The issue seems to hang on what can be defined as a “reasonable expectation of success”. 
The general outlines can be determined from the following five cases. In case T 2168/11, the 
Board made a general delineation based on its existing case law236 that the standard is not 
one of absolute certainty.237 The fact that other competing research teams were all following 
a similar course of action might indicate that that approach might be obvious to try, but in T 
296/93, the Board specifically stated that such hopes of success do not entail obviousness 
                                                 
233 EPO Technical Board of Appeal, Decision: T 2/83 (Simethicone Tablet/Rider); Reasons, point 7. 
234 EPO Technical Board of Appeal, Decision: T 0149/93 (RETINOIDS/Kligman II); Reasons, point 5.2. 
235 See e.g.: Anderson et al. 2012, p. 586; Robienski & Simon 2014, p. 130. 
236 Specifically referring to cases T 192/06, T 278/03, and T 918/01. 
237 EPO Technical Board of Appeal, T 2168/11 (Alzheimer's disease beta amyloid peptide mouse 
model/ELAN ELI); Reasons, point 11, p. 32. 
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through a reasonable expectation of success. After all, any amount of such endeavors might 
end up failing. The Board continues by offering the following definition of a reasonable 
expectation of success: it is at hand when the skilled person is able to rationally foresee, 
based on knowledge existing prior to the commencement of a research project, the success 
of the project within a reasonable time frame. This implies a criterion of proportionality, in 
which expectations of success are deemed to be lower in new fields of technical research.238  
In cases T 816/90 and T 923/92 the Board iterated a position in which a theoretically 
straightforward course of action resulting in the solution does not necessarily imply a 
reasonable expectation of success, as the latter requires the ability to reliably make valid 
decisions when faced with complications.239 Finally, in case T 207/94 the Technical Board 
of Appeal stated that allegations targeting reasonable expectation of success must be based 
on technical facts.240 
Based on the jurisprudence of the EPO Boards of Appeal, it is possible to construct a 
generalized understanding on how the criterion of reasonable expectation of success is likely 
to affect bioparts and their assembly. As it currently stands, most new applications of 
bioparts require the construction of a new metabolic pathways, which is currently far from a 
trivial endeavor.241 Taking into account the nascent stage of the technology and the 
metabolic complications that constantly plague attempts to construct useful modular 
biosystems242, it is unlikely that allegations of obviousness based on a reasonable expectation 
of success will be accepted by the EPO.  
This may change in the future if structurally and functionally new bioparts utilize existing 
or similar metabolic pathways as older ones. The success of the field is in fact somewhat 
reliant on that happening.243 If we assume that assembling bioparts into systems becomes 
sufficiently easy, the criterion of ‘reasonable expectation of success’ may in extremis 
preclude the patenting of downstream applications resulting from such a process, or at least 
significantly reduce the potential scope of patent claims. This can result in seeking patents 
further upstream, as the creation of new bioparts and chassis will presumably continue to 
                                                 
238 EPO Technical Board of Appeal, T 296/93 (HBV antigen production/BIOGEN INC), Reasons, point 
7.4.4. 
239 EPO Technical Board of Appeal, T 816/90 (CHB II/ALKO); Reasons, point 5.2.7, p. 9–10. T 923/92 
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have a much lower expectation of success than their subsequent assembly.244 More 
importantly, no matter how simple the scientific process of assembling bioparts into systems 
becomes, the existence of such upstream patents means that commercialized downstream 
biosystems will require at least some patented technologies as inputs. Obtaining the 
necessary licenses means that developing novel downstream applications of synthetic 
biology will remain a costly endeavor, but with the additional detriment of a decreased scope 
of patent protection for the commercial application itself. This generates an obvious 
incentive problem, the solving of which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
3.3.3. Industrial applicability 
The final step in assessing the four criteria of patentability as they pertain to synthetic 
biology involves industrial applicability. To wit, EPC Article 57 provides: 
An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be 
made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture. 
As a starting point for the interpretation of this provision, Rule 29(3) of the Implementing 
Regulations specifies the nature of the Article above in relation to genetic sequences and 
partial sequences by stating that the industrial application of any such invention must be 
specified in the patent application. Guideline G-III, 4. contains the specific disclosure 
requirements. Following similar provisions as in recitals 23-25 of the Biotechnology 
Directive, the rule specifies that in the case of exons, the encoded protein must be disclosed, 
or if the sequence is non-exonal, its function must be described in some other manner.245 In 
concordance with Recital 23 of the Biotechnology Directive, Rule 29(3) additionally 
specifies that applications for genetic sequences that do not contain a specified function for 
the sequence do not fulfil this criterion. In effect, this rule effectively “raises the bar”, 
precluding the speculative patenting of genetic material.246 
The question of industrial application is generally considered to be of relatively minor 
consequence, save for the requirements of disclosure outlined above.247 However, one 
specific case is worthy of note in this discussion. In case T 0870/04, the TBA was tasked 
                                                 
244 N.B.: To make a very simplistic analogy: LEGO bricks were considered patentable subject matter (U.S. 
patent US3005282 (A)), but a tower made of such bricks would certainly not be, even if such a tower had 
some interesting commercial application. 
245 N.B.: This rule is follows recital 24 of the Biotechnology Directive almost verbatim.  
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with evaluating an appeal pertaining to a rejected patent application claiming the structure 
of the protein BPD1 and production methods thereof.248 The application was rejected inter 
alia due to the fact that it only contained indications of prospective industrial use that was 
contingent on future development of the field.249 The Board concluded that speculative 
industrial application is insufficient, with the application leaving its reader the burden of 
having “to guess or find a way to exploit it in industry by carrying out work in search for 
some practical application geared to financial gain, without any confidence that any practical 
application exists”250. In effect, this means that merely describing a protein as indicated by 
Guideline G-III, 4 does not ensure industrial applicability, nor is it sufficient to have that 
protein be in some way useful as an object of basic research. 
Due to the design element inherent in the modularity of bioparts, it can be assumed that no 
sensible research effort will be expended in studying or constructing parts with no function. 
Therefore it is likely that a description of the role of the part in a device or a device in a 
system is sufficient to fulfil the requirement of industrial application. However, the case 
T0870/04 does have implications to the basic research from which synthetic biology derives 
its materials. In that field, mere indications and possibilities of industrial application are 
insufficient. This can be construed as being positive for SynBio, as it results in certain 
products of fundamental research being unpatentable, lowering the amount of patent inputs 
required in constructing e.g. a biopart. 
3.3.4. Ordre public 
One final issue of patentability remains, which involves the general rules that denote non-
patentable subject matter. Most patent legislation worldwide contains a prohibition against 
granting patents to inventions against that are against general public morality, i.e. ordre 
public. Article 53(a) contains the following provision on the matter:  
European patents shall not be granted in respect of:   
(a) Inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to "ordre 
public" or morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely 
because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States. 
                                                 
248 EPO Technical Board of Appeal, T 0870/04 (BDP1 Phosphatase/MAX-PLANCK) of 11.5.2005. 
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Many commentators have argued against such considerations in the patenting process, as 
well as the inclusion of an ordre public provision in general.251 The primary argument in this 
view is that granting a patent is not the same as granting approval to produce the invention 
specified by the patent.252 As an example, synthetic biology inventions must comply with a 
wide range of other regulation.253 Accordingly, the most natural place for moral and ethical 
considerations is in authorization and compliance procedures created through other 
legislation and regulation. The patent authority should only consider whether the patent 
application fulfils the traditional criteria of patentability254, namely whether the purported 
invention is novel, inventive, and industrially applicable. 
Other scholars choose to take a diametrically opposing view on the matter. In the case of 
biotechnological patents, and synthetic biology by extension, scholars such as Schneider 
have discussed the idea of expanding the scope of Article 53(a) of the EPC by allowing the 
consideration the broader societal consequences of SynBio patents. In this model, the ordre 
public considerations would include bioethical evaluation, such as the patents’ implications 
to public health, biodiversity, and the availability of nutrition, as well as purely economic 
ones, such as considering the patent’s effects on the concentration of economic power and 
possible market failures that may arise from such a process.255 In effect, this can be seen as 
an attempt at including aspects of RRI as discussed in section 2.5. of this thesis into the 
criteria of patentability. 
Both the arguments certainly have their merits. The opponents are undoubtedly correct that 
in most situations, it is the commercialization and usage of the invention itself that can be 
detrimental, and the regulatory authorities have sufficient means to deal with such issues. 
This point of view is predicated on managing the negative consequences of the patented 
inventions. However, the scholars opposing ordre public arguments seemingly fail to note 
the potential negative consequences of the patents themselves. As stated previously, the 
granting of exclusionary rights entails a monopoly, which can potentially be extremely 
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detrimental both in terms of static and dynamic efficiency. This theoretical discussion on 
ordre public leads us to the following question: does the EPO consider the socioeconomic 
issues raised by patents as an element of ordre public? If so, some of the potentially negative 
effects of upstream patenting on SynBio innovation could be taken into account in the 
patenting process. 
In its decision G1/98256, EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) formulated a clear 
response to the relationship of economic consequences and ordre public. The patent in 
question related to a plant product produced through rDNA technology257. In the decision, 
the EBA concluded that its task was not to evaluate the economic consequences of patents 
in specific areas, or to restrict the scope of patentable subject-matter as a result of such 
evaluations.258 The Board continues by stating that biotechnological inventions are not 
considered to be contrary to public morality in the Contracting States even in an economic 
sense, as the Biotechnology Directive establishes the necessity of promoting innovation in 
this field in Europe.259 
This issue was further discussed in the decision T 1213/05260. The case in question revolves 
around the patentability of a tumor suppressor gene, BRCA1. Certain mutations in BRCA1 
are highly correlated with a susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancer in women261, which 
results in its high relevance in genetic screening tests provided to women with a familial 
history of those forms of cancer. In the case in question, one of the opponents (Greenpeace) 
argued that EPO’s Technical Board of Appeal should consider the applicability of Article 
53(a) in determining the patentability of BRCA1. Greenpeace argued that the patent in suit 
would have negative socio-economic consequences by increasing healthcare costs, as well 
as limiting research and diagnosis modalities, all of which would be highly detrimental to 
carriers of the gene and doctors alike.262 The Technical Board responded by noting that 
Article 53(a) in general pertains only to the effects of the commercial exploitation of the 
invention, not the patent.263 Greenpeace attempted to qualify this statement by noting that 
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the patent and invention were inseparable in this case.264 This argument was rejected by the 
Technical Board. The Board went on to state that as patents generally limit competition, such 
an objection could be made for any patent in any field.265 As the EPC does not contain any 
basis for discriminating between patents in this manner, the ordre public-argument cannot 
be used to render otherwise patentable subject-matter unpatentable in this way266. 
In summation, EPO’s stance on the matter is clear. Negative socioeconomic consequences 
cannot be construed as rendering an invention unpatentable as meant in Article 53(a). Even 
if such arguments were possible, they would have to pertain to the exploitation of the 
invention, not the patent itself. Consequently, such concerns cannot be used to mitigate 
patent-economic problems. Some criticism of EPO’s argumentation is however warranted. 
The argument in case G1/98 of the Biotechnology Directive establishing the economic 
necessity of patenting biotechnological inventions does not attest to the welfare effects of 
such patents. It makes sense as a purely positivist argument, but the wording of the decision 
indicates that the reference establishes an economic fact by means of legislation. 
3.4. The patent landscape of SynBio 
As a final note on this chapter of substantive patent law, it is necessary to include some 
concept of the actual patent landscape of synthetic biology inventions in Europe. Due to the 
proximity of SynBio and rDNA technologies, it is very difficult to formulate a clear picture 
on the patent landscape of synthetic biology. A patent analysis study by van Doren et al. 
indicates that up to the year 2010, 1,195 WIPO patents have been granted for inventions 
involving synthetic biology, with a total of 3,998 applicants involved in said applications.267 
The analysis also indicates that most of the activity in filing patents took place in the United 
States of America, with Japan and Germany following.268 The global trend is one of 
increasing patent activity, increasing from only 8 filed patents per annum in 1991 to 86 in 
2010.269 However, as there is no IPC subclass or subgroup for synthetic biology, the authors 
acknowledge that their choice of search terms will likely have limited the scope of the 
search.270 
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4. The IP economics of synthetic biology 
4.1. The economic rationale of patents 
As is likely clear by this point, the IPR of choice in synthetic biology is patenting. Given the 
general nature of the preceding allusions regarding the potential of patents to generate socio-
economically suboptimal results271, a more rigorous analysis is necessary in to form a clear 
view on the matter. As the objective of this thesis is to maximize aggregate welfare through 
ensuring the viability of synthetic biology, the most natural language for such a further 
analysis is economics. Building on a coherent understanding of the fundamental economic 
logic of the patent system and its objectives allows us to highlight the specific socio-
economic issues that synthetic biology might face in the future. Using the same toolkit, it is 
also possible to identify certain generalized economic solutions. Performing such an analysis 
is the exact purpose of this chapter. First, it is necessary to understand the nature of the rights 
that a patent entails and the justifications of such rights. 
The primary right entailed by a patent is to provide the patentee with the temporally limited 
right to exclude others from using the invention without the permission of the patentee.272 
This right of exclusion generates what is in effect a monopoly right to the technology in 
question273, provided that the use of the invention is not limited by other authorization 
mechanisms, such as with patented pharmaceutical compounds.274 The welfare detrimental 
nature of unrestricted monopolies is generally considered to be an economic fact275, at least 
to the extent that legislators view it as one. It is therefore necessary to understand the 
reasoning of legislators in creating a system that encourages the inefficiencies generated 
through monopolization.  
Machlup and Penrose give a summary of the traditional arguments to justify the existence of 
a patent system. The first two of the arguments are based on idealistic notions of inalienable 
property rights276 and compensatory justice277. The following two arguments are economic 
in nature, and thus are more consequential to the approach adopted in this thesis. The third 
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argument states that patent systems are the simplest way to ensure that both inventors and 
investors may attain a profit from their venture, thus creating an incentive for new 
innovations.278 The fourth argument is that patent systems ensure the disclosure of new 
developments in technology, thus ensuring the dissemination of ideas and further spurring 
innovation.279 Multitudes of scholars have adopted similar definitions, highlighting the 
importance of patents in improving welfare by providing a legal monopoly of pre-
determined length for innovators to recoup their R&D costs.280 The essence of this reasoning 
lies in the notion that while innovation generally improve the market power of the innovator, 
if the innovator does not have means of appropriating the outcomes of their research, others 
will freeride on the results, logically leading to either a) keeping innovation as secret as 
possible, which reduces the overall development of technologies, or b) no innovation at 
all.281 This logic highlights the primacy of dynamic efficiency concerns over static 
inefficiency, meaning that innovation is deemed to be of greater societal importance than the 
monopoly pricing entailed by the granting of exclusionary rights.282  
These traditional views on the economic logic of patents have been built upon considerably 
since Machlup and Penrose provided their overview. Multiple patent theorists have 
developed more refined models, most of which generally contain the same line of reasoning 
as outlined above, but add novel aspects. Two such schools of thought will be considered in 
the following discussion: prospect theory and anticommons theory.283  
4.2. Prospect theory 
Prospect theorists emphasize the importance of patents as property rights.284 While following 
broadly similar ideas regarding the traditional incentives to invent presented by Machlup 
and Penrose, prospect theorists focus on the ex post role of patents as tools for the optimal 
management of inventions.285 Prospect theory builds on two established economic concepts: 
tragedy of the commons and Coase’s theorem.286 The first of the two concepts was coined 
by Garret Hardin in a 1968 article in the journal Science, in which he posits that a commons 
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resource, such as fish in the ocean, is characterized by the lack of any user having the right 
to exclude others from using that resource, which leads to that resource being overused.287 
The common solution for the commons problem is to privatize the commons resource, 
granting property rights which, by definition, include the right to exclude others from using 
the now-private property.288 One of the fathers of the prospect theorem, Edmund Kitch, 
argues that a similar situation exists with innovative ideas if they were to be constructed as 
non-proprietary public resources; generating commercial applications of those ideas would 
be very inefficient without the means to make the ideas proprietary.289 Assigning ‘prospect’ 
rights similar to what are used in the mining industry is a way to overcome this problem.290  
The importance of the second aspect of prospect theory, Coase’s theorem, hinges on the fact 
that patent rights are transferrable and subject to be licensed to others. Coase’s theorem states 
that the initial allocation of property rights does not matter if transaction costs are low and 
property rights are well defined. In such a situation, the free market will ensure an efficient 
allocation of property rights through bargaining, which results in a coherent property 
structure that internalizes economic externalities.291 In the view of prospect theorists, the 
assigning of prospect rights to ideas combined with Coasean bargaining ensures that such 
ideas are turned into commercial products in the most optimal way possible.292  
Prospect theory by contains an inherently positive attitude towards upstream patenting.293 
Their general point in this respect is that extensive patent rights in the highest points of the 
upstream, actors within latter two stages of development may easily misappropriate the work 
and investment of the initial researchers, leading to freeriding and diminished incentives in 
generating and investing in initial innovations.294 In second, due to the lack of prior art, 
patent claims in foundational inventions can be constructed broadly, which is likely to 
generate significant investment into new fields of technology295, thus spurring technological 
advancement and the dynamic efficiency benefits it entails. 
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4.3. Anticommons and patent thickets 
Since the late 1990s, an increasing amount of study has been devoted to the critique of the 
prospect theorem and its conclusions. While accepting the fundamental role that patents play 
in fostering innovation as described by Machlup and Penrose, these critics have sought to 
illustrate that an increased number of patent applications and grants might in fact be 
economically, scientifically, and socially welfare-detrimental.  In the words of Nobel 
laureate Joseph Stiglitz:  
“[W]e have an innovation system in which one innovation builds on another. If you 
get monopoly rights down at the bottom, you may stifle competition that uses those 
patents later on, and so . . . the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not 
only to stifle competition, but also [can] have adverse effects in the long run on 
innovation. We have to strike a balance.”296 
The critics of prospect theory generally base their argumentation on the following two 
concepts in patent economics: the tragedy of the anticommons and patent thickets. As the 
name would indicate, the tragedy of the anticommons is a conceptual mirror-image the 
aforementioned commons tragedy. In his seminal article on the topic, Heller sought to 
illustrate that attempts to fix the tragedy of the commons through privatization can lead to a 
result which is equally detrimental, namely “a property regime in which multiple owners 
hold effective rights of exclusion in a scarce resource”297. The problem in such a situation is 
that the initial endowment of property is done in a disaggregated manner, which results in 
multiple owners being able to exclude each other from using the resource in question298, with 
no single party having effective privileges of use299. Heller argues that the incentive to use 
exclusionary rights to extract maximal rent results in the wasteful underuse of the 
resource.300 An apt analogy for an anticommons is that it is similar to the likely effects of a 
fictitious constitutional requirement of unanimity in passing legislation. If such a rule 
existed, a single Member of Parliament voting against a proposal would result in the proposal 
not passing. Given the nature of democracy, it is likely that someone will always vote against 
any given proposal, at least if not promised something in return. As it is likely impossible to 
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bribe everyone that can block legislation in every instance, little to no legislation would be 
passed. 
Despite its origins in discussing post-socialist property rights, commentators were quick to 
point out that the nature of patents as instruments of exclusion results in the patent system 
having an inbuilt potential to generate anticommons problems.301 Building on this line of 
reasoning, Heller and Eisenberg argue that the biotechnological industry has an especially 
high potential to form anticommons due to the prevalence of large amounts of exclusionary 
property rights in general302 and upstream patents in particular303. In effect, Heller and 
Eisenberg argue that biotechnology is a complex technology, which by definition304 requires 
multiple complementary innovations in order to generate efficient solutions to technical 
problems. Innovation in these fields may easily result in property rights to such technical 
solutions being granted exactly in the manner described by Heller.305 
4.3.1. Fragmentation and overlap 
The fundamental problem in a patent anticommons is one of fragmentation. This is a direct 
result of the increasing number of complementary upstream patents, which logically requires 
the innovator to obtain multiple licenses from multiple patentees.306 Fragmentation can occur 
both vertically and horizontally. Horizontal fragmentation denotes a situation in which 
upstream patents consist of multiple complementary ‘pieces’ of technology from the same 
level of technological development that are in some way combined in the new product.307 
Vertical fragmentation is especially relevant in fields of cumulative innovation. Such fields 
are vertically fragmented if multiple upstream patents cover the preceding steps in the 
cumulative process.308 As applied to synthetic biology, an example of horizontal 
fragmentation is the need to combine multiple proprietary bioparts into a device, whereas 
vertical fragmentation is at hand if a SynBio innovator must obtain licenses to research tools, 
fundamental technologies, bioparts, and devices in order to assemble a novel system. 
A very similar problem may arise when two or more patents have claims that overlap, 
making it exceedingly difficult for a downstream innovator to determine which of the 
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patents, if not all, should be licensed.309 Even if the patent landscape was not particularly 
fragmented, an innovator might still be required to obtain multiple licenses, as it would be 
impossible to determine ex ante which of the overlapping patents is relevant. Following Burk 
and Lemley’s nomenclature, this phenomenon is referred to as a patent thicket.310311 
Although seemingly similar, the distinction between anticommons and patent thickets is an 
important one. Fragmentation does not necessarily imply overlap, as the claims contained 
within the multitudes of upstream patents might be easily distinguished from one another; it 
is the sheer number of such patents which results in fragmentation. On the other hand, 
overlap does not automatically entail high levels of fragmentation. If only two upstream 
patents have overlapping claims, it can hardly be said that the patent landscape is 
fragmented.312 The practical importance of this conceptual distinction will be revisited when 
discussing solutions to these two problems. 
Despite their differences, both anticommons and patent thickets entail similar economic 
problems. Researchers of patent economics have identified three distinct types of market 
failure that arise from these two concepts: royalty stacking, patent hold-up and suboptimal 
transaction costs. Royalty stacking is a result of the complementarity of upstream patents in 
both anticommons and patent thickets.313 In both situations, a new innovation requires 
several patented technologies as inputs, which necessitates that the innovator obtain licenses 
for all such inputs, assuming that the innovator does not wish to run the risk of a patent 
infringement suit, including the risk of an injunction on producing the product containing 
the patented technology.314 Economic logic based on the most rigorous formulation of the 
rational choice theorem315 dictates that the licensors of these input technologies will each 
seek to maximize the value of their own IP by demanding as high royalties for the license as 
possible.316 In doing so, the licensor has no direct reason to take into account the fact that 
the licensors of other complementary technologies are doing the exact same thing.317 If a 
sufficiently large amount of licenses is required, the cost entailed by the royalties may 
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subsume or even exceed the value of the downstream invention, resulting in downstream 
innovation generally becoming economically unviable.318 In this sense, royalty stacking is 
equivalent to the well-known problem in pricing complementary goods identified by 
Cournot, which states that complementary goods sold by separate monopolists result in 
lesser demand than if a single monopolist selling both goods.319 
Patent hold-up is a strategic problem that arises from the blocking nature of proprietary 
upstream technologies. According to Shapiro, if an innovator has already expended a great 
amount of resources into a the development of a downstream technology, such as hiring 
R&D staff, constructing a laboratory, and obtaining other necessary licenses, the economic 
importance of any remaining blocking patents becomes all the much higher.320 If the licensor 
of a remaining blocking technology is aware of the licensee having committed themselves 
to a project that the licensor has the power to block, the bargaining power of the licensor 
increases dramatically.321 In turn, general economic logic states that an increase in 
bargaining power equates to a higher payoff for the party that has it.322 Combined with the 
royalty stacking discussed above, this indicates that the cost of licensing increases for each 
subsequent blocking technology.323 The problem of patent hold-up may be exacerbated by 
the phenomenon known as the sunk cost fallacy, in which the licensor does not fully 
appreciate the fact that the resources expended prior to the licensing cannot be recovered.324 
To put it more simply: the more one has committed themselves to a project, the harder it is 
to abandon it, and the more someone can charge for making it possible to continue it.  
The general problem of suboptimal transaction costs325 is less strategic than either of the 
aforementioned problems. One instance of fragmentation and overlap increasing transaction 
costs is the issue of search costs, denoting the simple fact that a licensor must locate all the 
relevant patents that they require as inputs.326 As an example of extreme fragmentation and 
search costs, downstream developers in the smartphone industry may require up to 15,000 
patented technologies as inputs merely to ensure that their product conforms to a set of 
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technical standards,327 let alone the patents on the other components of the phone. The mere 
act of identifying all such patents requires considerable expenditure of time and effort, 
especially for new companies in the industry. Exacerbating the issue of search costs is the 
fact that the patents may be traded, requiring that the patentee either locate the new patent 
holder/licensor or risk having to adopt an entirely alternate technological approach in 
developing their product. As it currently stands, the EPO holds no centralized register of 
patent transactions after the opposition period for the patent has concluded.328329 
A second instance of increased transaction costs has to do with the bargaining costs of 
acquiring the licenses. Assuming that the licensing agreements for all upstream patents are 
not identical, obtaining multiple licenses requires expending a great deal of resources in the 
actual negotiation and drafting of each individual licensing agreement.330 The relationship 
of both these transaction costs to the number upstream patents is linear: the more fragmented 
and overlapping the field, the more relevant patents must be identified and licensing 
agreements must be negotiated. If all of the upstream patents are not of extremely high 
economic importance to their respective patentees, this configuration is likely to be non-
Pareto optimal.331 To clarify this point: if the necessary upstream patents were held by a 
single entity, a single licensing agreement and the transaction costs it entails would suffice.  
Patent economists have noted that if sufficiently compounded, the aforementioned effects 
can lead to the abandonment of R&D efforts.332 To ensure the viability of any technology 
that may exhibit such effects requires some form of solution to fragmentation, overlap and 
transaction costs. Even though both anticommons and patent thickets have the potential to 
generate similar market failures, their conceptual difference indicates somewhat different 
structural remedies. Solving the anticommons requires the aggregation of patent rights into 
a coherent whole, whereas solving the patent thicket requires narrowing the scope of patent 
claims to reduce overlap.333 It must be noted that some scholars argue that the aggregation 
of upstream patents is patent pools is a viable way to deal with patent thickets and overlap 
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as well.334 Following van Overwalle’s argumentation and the approach adopted by the 
EPO335 leads to the conclusion that this is not the case. Even though aggregation may reduce 
the effect of overlap, this approach to solving the patent thicket does not take into account 
the possibility that a future overlapping technology might emerge.336 Even if all the pre-
existing overlapping technologies were aggregated, the patentee of a new overlapping 
technology would potentially be able to demand royalties or sue the licensees of the bundle 
for patent infringement.337 Consequently, the only structural solution to patent thickets is to 
ensure that patent claims do not overlap. 
4.4. Prospects vs. anticommons in biotechnology and synthetic biology 
The fundamental incompatibility of the prospect model and the anticommons model in 
regards to the patenting of upstream inventions has resulted in a lively debate between 
proponents of each model. Compounding the issue is the original formal model that 
compares the two, which shows that both commons and anticommons are conceptually 
symmetric, thus assuming an equal deadweight loss in welfare in both situations.338 As 
prospect theory addresses the former and anticommons the latter, this would imply that there 
is no effective way to choose between the two theories of patent protection, as both lead to 
similar levels of socioeconomic loss. However, further economic modelling has shown that 
as the transaction costs entailed in the generation of an anticommons are asymmetrically 
borne by the property owner and the licensor, generally to the detriment of the latter339, thus 
leading to theoretical doubts on equating a commons situation with an anticommons.  
Behavioral economic studies have further brought the initial formalistic assumption into 
question. A 2006 study by Vanneste et al. showed that in different variants of 
commons/anticommons scenarios, subjects 1) consistently demanded higher payments for 
usage rights in an anticommons setting than what they themselves used in a commons, and 
2) anticommons lead to a greater level of underuse than commons to overuse.340 If 
generalized, this leads to the conclusion that an anticommons is even more socially 
detrimental than a commons dilemma in the same situation. This implies that prospect 
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theorists overstate the importance of appropriation as a means to ensure the efficient 
production of innovative products, at least when it comes to complex technologies.  
Furthermore, in his considerably extensive and thorough study of the arguments of prospect 
theorists and anticommons theorists in relation to biomedical upstream patenting, Wang 
conclusively shows that prospect theory provides excessively high incentives to patentees, 
without taking to account the anti-competitive effects engendered by patents.341 This leads 
Wang to conclude that prospect theory is an invalid model for ensuring optimal levels of 
innovation in the biotechnological industry.342 Therefore it is possible to conclude that an 
anticommons situation should be avoided even at the risk of creating a commons problem. 
4.4.1. Empirical studies on the existence of anticommons and patent thickets  
Although it can be established that the biotechnological industry in general and synthetic 
biology by extension has the definite theoretical potential to develop anticommons and 
patent thickets, it is necessary to determine whether this has taken place in reality. In the 
case of established industries such as biotechnology, multiple patent landscape analyses and 
questionnaire studies have been conducted on the matter. Unfortunately, the same cannot be 
said for synthetic biology. No empirical studies dealing exclusively with the two problems 
as they relate to synthetic biology were discovered when researching this thesis. Given that 
the technology is still in its infancy, it is likely that such studies would not even produce 
meaningful results. The analysis must consequently be constructed through analogy by 
overviewing the empirical research on the existence of anticommons and patent thickets in 
the conceptual precursor industries of synthetic biology, namely biotechnology, the 
semiconductor industry, and computer technology.   Such an analogy makes it possible to 
determine whether anticommons and patent tickets generally form easily in technologies 
which are often regarded as being inherently complex. 
An oft-cited study in the prevalence of anticommons and patent thickets in the 
biotechnological industry is the 2003 US study by Walsh et al. regarding patents and licenses 
on biotechnological research tools. In conducting the study, they interviewed a total of 70 
people that included industrial R&D executives, trade association personnel, university 
researchers, patent lawyers, and government officials.343 The purpose of the interviews was 
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to gain an insider perspective on whether patent proliferation had in fact resulted in 
fragmentation and overlap.344 Regarding the transaction costs implied by fragmentation, a 
majority of representatives within the industry stated that the large number of patents was 
less of a problem than it seemed, as the hundreds of potentially pertinent patents could be 
whittled down to only a few that required licensing.345 Royalty stacking was not considered 
a major concern.346 In general, the study found that only a relative few research project was 
abandoned due to anticommons or patent thicket considerations.347 
A patent landscape analysis of European and US patents by Huys et al. relating to genetic 
diagnostic testing showed that while 25% of the patents studies were on genetic sequences, 
only 3% of patents in the entire study could be considered blocking patents348, which implies 
the non-existence of an anticommons or patent thicket in genetic patenting. Possibly the most 
revealing study in this category is a 2015 patent analysis of global scope by Liddicoat et al. 
focusing on gene diagnostic tests with blocking patents. They find that such blocking patents 
may play a role in the United States and Japan, but the situation in Europe is considerably 
less marred by such concerns.349 In analyzing the results of these studies and other similar 
ones, van Overwalle even goes as far as to claim that the notion of anticommons and patent 
thickets should finally be put to rest in the issue of genetics patenting.350 
Does this mean that anticommons and patent thickets are a non-issue and prospect theory is 
empirically vindicated after all? Studies conducted by inter alia the EPO indicate otherwise. 
As an example, a 2013 EPO report by the Economic and Scientific Advisory Board identifies 
several problematic manifestations of patent thickets in relation to European patents, with 
multiple industries based on complex technologies exhibiting high levels of pendency, 
decreasing quality of applications, lack of transparency in ownership, increasing search costs 
of determining prior art, and an increased willingness of patent holders to litigate.351 
Regardless, the empiric studies discussed in the previous paragraphs would strongly suggest 
that the biotechnological industry is in no immediate risk of forming either anticommons or 
patent thickets. Is it likely to be a non-issue in synthetic biology as well? Assuming that it 
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will not be of relevance disregards the fact that SynBio combines approaches from multiple 
fields of technology, such as the aforementioned semiconductor industry and computer 
technology industry. Empiric studies discussing the prevalence of the two problems as they 
relate to these industries paint a very different picture than what might be inferred from 
biotechnology alone. 
An illuminating study in this respect is the 2013 study conducted by the UK Intellectual 
Propety Office (UKIPO) on the existence of patent thickets within various industries that 
have been granted European patents.352 The specific form of patent thicket discussed in the 
study is a triple. Developed by von Graeveniz et al., a triple is a conceptual form of a minimal 
patent thicket in which three companies each possess blocking patents to the applications of 
the other two.353 As for the existence of such triples in European patents granted by the EPO, 
the UKIPO confirmed that the biotechnology industry exhibits low levels of triple-type 
patent thickets, with only 0.9 triples per 1000 patents out of a study-wide average of 38.6 
triples per 1000 patents. However, the situation is markedly different both in the 
semiconductor industry (105.5 triples/1000 patents) and the computer technology industry 
(95.5 triples/1000 patents).354 
The general case presented by the empirical studies discussed in this section would indicate 
that complex technologies exhibit constantly increasing levels of patenting, but the actual 
formation of anticommons and/or patent thickets is not a given.355 While the situation in the 
biotechnological industry is encouraging in this respect, the results of the UKIPO study 
regarding the other precursor industries of synthetic biology are considerably less so. If the 
SynBio practitioners that follow the IP frame adopt patenting practices that are similar to the 
semiconductor and computer technology industries, the end result might very well resemble 
the anticommons and thickets found in those industries, along with the full spectrum of 
concomitant economic inefficiencies they entail.  
4.4.2. SynBio anticommons and patent thickets 
The attention now turns to assessing the aforementioned likelihood of an IP frame in SynBio 
resulting in an anticommons and/or patent thicket. As indicated above, most of the literature 
involves the more general case of the potential for anticommons and patent thickets in 
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biotechnology, with relatively few studies devoted exclusively to its applicability to 
synthetic biology in particular.356 Following the approach adopted in the previous empiric 
section, this assessment is constructed through analogies to the predecessor technologies of 
synthetic biology.  
First and foremost, it must be reiterated that synthetic biology is a cumulative technology, 
meaning that it requires multiple vertically structured enabling technologies to produce 
downstream applications.357 Colangelo argues that industries that feature such cumulative 
innovation are highly prone to develop IPR anticommons and patent thickets.358 One might 
very well argue that since biotechnology has not exhibited these effects, they are likely not 
to be of consequence in SynBio. This argument would disregard certain important factors. 
As stated in section 2.1. of this thesis, it is the modularity of SynBio constructs which 
differentiates it from pre-existing forms of biotechnology. If its potential becomes reality, 
the iterative assembly of bioparts into devices, devices into systems, and systems 
implemented in a chassis is more similar to constructing a computer from components than 
it is editing a gene.  
As an outgrowth of biotechnology, synthetic biology contains all the cumulative aspects of 
the former while making considerable additions to it. The result of this is that synthetic 
biology entails considerably higher levels of cumulative innovation than other forms of 
biotechnology. A developed form of SynBio may indeed likely resemble e.g. the 
semiconductor industry more than it does traditional biotechnology. Wellhausen and Oye 
state that this is partially due to the fact that, compared to historically preceding subfields of 
biotechnology, synthetic biology simply has more material that may fall within the scope of 
IPR protection. In addition to the aforementioned modular standardized parts, IPR protection 
can be extended to assembly and performance standards, device and system design, and the 
research tools to create and combine all of the above.359 The situation could be even worse: 
Montague et al. have opined that any practical application of synthetic biology will 
necessarily go beyond the strict confines of pre-existing metabolic pathways, with efficient 
systems requiring dozens of additional modifications to different parts of the genome.360 
Such changes to other parts of the genome carry the risk of infringing patents that are prima 
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facie unrelated to the system under development. Following a generally similar line of 
argumentation leads de Miguel Beriain to conclude that due to the varied nature of upstream 
patents required in synthetic biology, at least some of which are likely to be blocking, 
coupled with the varying incentive structures of the actors in the field, the formation of an 
anticommons seems quite likely.361 
Therefore it can be concluded that there exists a definite possibility that the IP frame of 
synthetic biology may result in a fragmented and overlapping patent landscape. While not 
by any means a definitive and conclusive argument, given the welfare-reducing effects of 
anticommons and patent thickets both on downstream innovators and, through a decrease of 
dynamic efficiency, society at large, I would argue that it is better to err on the side of 
caution. If one is to accept the notions put forth in section 1.2. of this thesis regarding the 
necessity of an ex ante framework for the managing of emerging technologies, some pre-
emptive measures are worth considering. However, given the as-yet hypothetical nature of 
the risk of fragmentation and overlap in synthetic biology, this cautionary approach should 
not result in drastic measures that would only be warranted by a total collapse of all potential 
innovation within the field. It merely emphasizes the importance of one of the initial 
conditions set for any normative solutions that this thesis may contain: simplicity. 
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5. The normative logic of solving fragmentation and overlap 
5.1. Normative standard 
Constructing a normative approach to the problems outlined above requires some standard 
of measurement for the patent system. One obvious line of reasoning for constructing such 
a measurement is to return to the fundamental ideas described by Machlup and Penrose. 
Their third argument is the most pertinent in this case, i.e. creating an incentive to innovate. 
Moreover, neither prospect theorists nor anticommons theorists have disputed the role of 
patents as a means of engendering innovation; they merely seek to optimize this logic.  
As discussed previously, one fundamental elements of both this thesis and the patent system 
in general is the primacy of optimal dynamic efficiency in generating welfare. Following 
Colangelo’s approach, this mode of though provides us with the necessary standard of 
measurement for the efficiency of the patent system: maximizing the difference of value 
between the static inefficiency of social losses incurred by the creation of exclusionary rights 
and that of the dynamic efficiency resulting from new innovations such exclusionary rights 
have made possible.362 As a corollary to this logic, if the patent system results in the creation 
of exclusionary rights while also stifling innovation, a patent monopoly is unjustified. Given 
the conclusions of the previous chapter, it seems evident that the formation of an 
anticommons and/or patent thicket in the field of synthetic biology is the most pressing 
concern in this respect. The remainder of this thesis is devoted to discussing measures that 
may reduce the risks posed by a potentially fragmented and overlapping patent landscape. 
5.2. Network effects as a source of efficiency 
Henkel and Maurer have delineated three important economic characteristics of a functional 
parts-based synthetic biology paradigm: 1) the (bio)parts that compose devices will be 
reused, 2) each de novo assembly of such parts will be a costly endeavor, 3) reusing parts in 
new devices reduces costs, provided that the new experiment is constructed using a similar 
metabolic pathway as the preceding ones.363 Following this line of argumentation leads them 
to conclude that a parts-based approach in synthetic biology exhibits positive consumption 
externalities, more commonly known as network effects.364 In practical terms this means that 
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the general willingness to use a biopart increases the more others have used it365, as the 
marginal costs across the entire network are lowered by subsequent use. As shown by Katz 
and Shapiro, network effects are a common occurrence in markets with complementary 
goods.366 Therefore it is hardly surprising that such an effect shows up in synthetic biology, 
as the bioparts approach is fundamentally based on combining complementary parts to 
construct devices and systems.  
Network effects can create sufficiently high positive externalities to mitigate some of the 
harmful effects arising in patent monopolies. One classical example of monopoly behavior 
is that a monopolist is incentivized to limit supply through a decrease in the production of 
the monopoly good so that marginal cost equals marginal revenue, which results in the 
maximization of the monopolist’s payoff.367 When discussing intellectual property, the 
analogous behavior is to limit access to a proprietary technology by means of the 
exclusionary property of patents, allowing the patentee to charge monopoly-type royalty 
payments for licenses.368 If this results in monopoly royalties being sufficiently high, it 
would imply the stifling of network effects, as the use of upstream proprietary IPRs remains 
low due to high royalty fees.369  However, if the potential network externalities are high 
enough, the patentee monopolist benefits more from the expansion of the network than from 
charging monopoly prices for licenses to their patents in a single instance.370 In practical 
terms, this means that all the patentees within a technological field might be strategically 
inclined to make licenses to their technologies as easy to obtain as possible, in hopes of 
benefitting from network externalities resulting from the adoption of their technologies.371 
The logical result of this is that in the presence of sufficiently high network effects, the 
patentees would seek to coordinate their efforts to reduce royalty stacking, hold-up, and 
transaction costs. One practical way of doing this is through offering licenses to downstream 
developers for a fair price372, or even royalty free373. 
The network benefits may extend to the licensing agreements themselves. In this vein, 
Korobkin has noted that the standardization of contract terms can lead to their own network 
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benefits, as they are more likely to face adjudication early on, leading to a greater shared 
understanding of the specifics and implications of the terms. Standardized terms also 
naturally reduce the aforementioned bargaining costs through lowering contract negotiation 
and drafting costs.374 The combination of both technological and contractual network effects 
has led to the creation of standard licenses in many of the precursors of SynBio, such as by 
in the electronics industry.375 As for ensuring similar effects in synthetic biology, one 
practical way in which both forms of network effects may be attained is through a SynBio 
parts-monopolist encouraging the use of its proprietary bioparts by licensing its IPRs on 
standardized fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.376 
The crux of the matter seems relatively straightforward then: network effects have the 
potential to mitigate royalty stacking, patent hold-up, and transaction costs in a developed 
form of synthetic biology, provided that the technology produces sufficiently high positive 
network externalities. Creating a system which encourages the emergence of such network 
effects is a valid way of ensuring the viability of the technology, which in turn has the 
potential to improve societal welfare. If such systems are not in place, it is a definite 
possibility that the positive network externalities fall short of the limit that encourages 
upstream patentees to cooperate both with each other and the downstream developers, which 
may result in a SynBio market that exhibits detrimental monopoly effects, such as royalty 
stacking, hold-up and suboptimal transaction costs, resulting in a welfare-suboptimal 
scenario.377 This statement is also a specific case of the generalized normative logic of the 
patent system as presented in the preceding section. 
5.3. Collective action problems 
Network effects by themselves may be sufficient in mitigating some of the aforementioned 
problems related to the emergence of biopart-monopolists. However, they do not seem 
capable of addressing the fundamental forces that drive the creation of fragmentation and 
overlap. Synthetic biology research is conducted all around the world, resulting in the more 
likely scenario of multiple patent holders.378 As such, the transaction costs described in 
section 4.3.1. of this thesis apply equally to patentees that seek to coordinate their efforts. 
As an extension of that logic: the more patentees there are, the more difficult it is to for them 
                                                 
374 Korobkin 2000, p. 128. 
375 Chappatte 2009, p. 322. 
376 Contreras et al. 2015, p. 24–25. 
377 Henkel & Maurer 2007, p. 2. 
378 Oldham et al. 2012, p. 5. 
62 
 
to generate network externalities as the costs of coordination increase. This raises an 
important point: solving the fundamental problems of fragmentation and overlap are a 
prerequisite for the creation of positive network externalities. A logical follow-up question 
in this line of reasoning is: can such network effect-generating solutions be constructed by 
free market actors without institutional intervention?  
Let us assume that Henkel and Maurer are correct in stating that SynBio inventions will 
exhibit network effects. In the case of overlap, it crucial to highlight the fact that while its 
effects may be mitigated by patentee coordination, it is fundamentally an institutional 
problem arising from faults in the patenting process itself.379 In the case of fragmentation, 
which is effectively a problem generated by the patentees themselves380, a network solution 
may be possible. However, one might naïvely assume that since cooperation is required for 
generating network effects, which are beneficial to both the patentees as a group and society 
at large, synthetic biology innovators and IPR holders will automatically choose to 
cooperate. Such an assumption would disregard the potential for collective action problems.  
In his influential book The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson noted that the best 
collective outcome requires that it is also in the interest of all of the private individuals 
involved in bringing about that outcome to perform the functions required of them.381 If the 
individuals in a group must make sacrifices or expend resources to attain a common goal, an 
individual may be tempted to benefit from the outcome without commensurate participation 
the effort to bring it about, unless the participation itself is beneficial to the individual.382 A 
rational individual will evaluate the strategies of cooperation and non-cooperation 
(henceforth referred to as defection) and choose the strategy that results in the most beneficial 
outcome to themselves. As all the rational individuals involved in the collective action do 
the same thing, the result is a confluence of strategic behavior, requiring every individual to 
evaluate the strategies of other individuals in order to discover the optimal course of 
action.383 Ensuring proper collective action in such an environment requires providing 
selective and separate incentives to the individual decision makers, thus aligning the goals 
of the group and the individuals that comprise it.384 Attaining this goal requires a more 
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detailed understanding of the strategic behavior of the individuals of the group, which can 
be accomplished by the tools provided by game theory.  
As the previously exposited logic of collective action problems indicates, joint-action 
agreements are not enforceable, i.e. the game is non-cooperative.385 The symmetry of the 
decision making process allows the players to know the strategic options of their opponents, 
meaning that the game is one of perfect information.386 The purpose of each player is to 
maximize their individual payoff387 by choosing the best response to the strategic decisions 
of other players388. In collective action games, the social optimum is the solution that 
maximizes the total payoff of the players.389 The situation presented above has the same 
incentive structure as the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which two players are similarly 
given a choice between two strategies: cooperate or defect. The variables in the following 
payoff table can be replaced with any numeric values, provided that the replacement values 
conform to the following relationships: T > R > P > S and R > (S + T)/2. The structure of 
the payoff table is the following390: 
                      Y 
  Cooperate Defect 
X Cooperate R, R S, T 
Defect T, S P, P 
 
The objective is to determine the Nash equilibrium, i.e. which strategy offers the players the 
best possible payoff while taking into account the best strategy of the other player.391 If 
player X assumes that Y will cooperate, the optimal strategy for X is to defect, because T > 
R. If player X assumes that Y will defect, the optimal strategy for is to defect as well, because 
P > S. Regardless of what Y chooses, defecting is X’s dominant strategy.392 Because the 
situation is symmetrical, the same holds true for Y. The result of the collision of these 
dominant strategies is the Nash equilibrium: [P, P]. The nature of this dilemma results from 
the fact that by cooperating, both would receive payoff [T, T], which is more socially optimal 
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than the Nash equilibrium, as T > P.393 In terms of classical economics, the rational pursuit 
of their self-interest results in both players receiving a Pareto inferior payoff.394 Following 
Thomas Schelling’s methodology, this logic can be extended to an N-person group395, which 
results in a strategic explanation of this form of collective action problem. 
One way to search for solutions is to recognize that the situation described above is only a 
single instance of decision making, whereas in real life, such one-off transactional 
relationships are relatively rare. If players engage in an ongoing relationship, such as a 
contractual arrangement, it effectively results in multiple iterations of the game with no 
predetermined end point, turning it to a continuously iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in which 
the Nash equilibrium may contain the option of cooperation.396 The so-called folk theorem 
indicates that all of the aforementioned contingent strategies are viable given certain values 
in the payoff table.397  This means that the players must take into account previous and future 
iterations of the game when making the decision to cooperate or defect in every subgame. 
Strategic behavior in such a scenario is determined by so-called contingent strategies, 
meaning that the players have a pre-defined notion of how respond to the actions of other 
players in future games.398 In continuously iterated games, players have three classical 
contingent strategies available: 1) limited period of punishment for defection, in which a 
player punishes another for defecting for a pre-determined amount of future iterations, 2) 
grim trigger, in which a player cooperates until the second player defects, after which the 
first player punishes the second player by choosing ‘defect’ in all future games, and 3) tit-
for-tat (TFT), in which a player always chooses the same strategy as the second player chose 
in the preceding instance of the game.399 The theoretical solution to such a configuration 
requires that one determines the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is wholly 
dependent on the discounted values of the payoffs in future iterations of the game. However, 
one does not need to rely purely on theory in solving the matter, as Axelrod and Hamilton 
famously showed that in simulated games of millions of iterations, TFT is the optimal 
contingent strategy in terms of highest total payoff produced.400 
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The third and final means of ensuring the socially optimal outcome is to alter the payoff 
matrix and its underlying incentive structure.401 Given that the underlying issue here has to 
do with aligning intellectual property rights, which are legal institutions, this would imply a 
change to those institutions through legislative or regulatory intervention.402 Furthermore, 
this approach can be combined with the second solution, resulting in a clear normative logic 
for solving the problem of collective action: institutional intervention that ensures the market 
actors are likely adopt a TFT strategy in their ongoing relationship. The legal implication of 
this idea is to remove all unnecessary hindrances in allowing patentee cooperation. 
5.4. Non-aligning incentives 
As shown above, resolving the collective action problem through adopting a model of 
cooperation is generally in the interests of the SynBio patent holders and licensors 
themselves, as they themselves will find it just as difficult to navigate the anticommons and 
patent thicket as any new downstream developer. De Miguel Beriain has noted that this has 
an extended effect on investors in such proprietary research endeavors, as a great deal of 
their investment into synthetic biology R&D might be spent on licensing fees, thus reducing 
the likelihood of valuable innovations and their commensurate return on investment.403 A 
similar empirical point is put forth by Ramirez, who states that proprietary research tools 
have been adopted by researchers despite private ownership404, and that research 
communities have a consistent vested interest in sharing scientific materials405. Building on 
this argumentation, one could easily come to the conclusion that since the best way for 
solving the collective action problem and generate network effects is for the IP holders actors 
in the field is to adopt a tit-for-tat contingent strategy, no other measures are needed. If truly 
rational, the IP market actors can address fragmentation issues themselves. 
While it can be concluded that the proposition given above is generally true for actors that 
have a vested interest in either conducting their own research or generating network effects, 
this view does not take into account so-called Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), more 
commonly known as “patent trolls”.406 PAEs are companies whose objective is to attain a 
patent portfolios that enables them to seek rents through licensing fees or damages through 
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patent infringement litigation.407 Harris convincingly argues that as their main rationale is to 
acquire blocking patents that they can subsequently use to extract as high royalties as 
possible, PAEs do not generally seek to further the technological field itself and are thus 
strategically indifferent when it comes to the dynamic inefficiencies generated by 
innovation.408 Furthermore, PAEs generally benefit from both fragmentation and overlap.409  
It is theoretically possible that PAEs would also seek network benefits by expanding the 
technology, but only for the purposes of attracting new downstream developers from which 
to extract rents.  
The take-away message from this discussion is that not all potential actors in a future SynBio 
IP frame may necessarily share the same incentive structure. For example, if a PAE manages 
to acquire a SynBio standard-essential patent in order to extract maximal rent from it, it is 
likely to affect collaboration between the producing patentees as well as limit possible 
network externalities. In terms of game theory, if one person defects, it is likely that others 
will defect as well. This implies that solving both fragmentation and overlap requires 
multiple solutions, depending on what type of entity those solutions address. If the SynBio 
patent landscape fragments, one set of solutions involves the upstream producing entities410 
involved in synthetic biology collaborating to form coherent property structures that they 
can subsequently license. The second set of solutions requires that measures to limit the 
effects generated by actors that have an incentive to produce welfare-detrimental effects, 
such as the aforementioned PAEs. A discussion on these tools forms the basis of the next 
chapter.  
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6. Approaches for constructing a viable SynBio framework 
6.1.  Market cooperation for reducing fragmentation in SynBio 
A great deal of scholarly interest has been devoted to studying various free market models 
of patent management that may potentially solve fragmentation, as well as ameliorate 
overlap, in complex technologies. Van Overwalle et al. identify three free market approaches 
commonly raised as means of overcoming the negative effects of fragmentation in the life 
sciences: cross-licensing, patent pools, and patent clearinghouses.411 While broad agreement 
exists that these instruments have the potential to assist in the development of synthetic 
biology as well412, not a great deal of actual literature seems to exist in relating these 
generalized models to synthetic biology, although generalized statements of their possible 
utility in the life sciences are abundant.413 In their recommendations, Minssen et al. 
emphasize the importance of further study on their applicability to synthetic biology414, 
which is the primary purpose of this section. The following approach is constructed in a 
similar way as in chapter 4.4. of this thesis, namely through analogies to how such tools are 
used in the management of IPRs in general and how they might be adapted to fit the uses of 
the IP frame in synthetic biology. 
6.1.1. Cross-licensing 
One commonly suggested general solution to patent thickets in particular is cross-licensing, 
which is a free-market arrangement that entails the reciprocal removal of the effects 
generated by blocking patents.415 The general situation in which such a solution is applicable 
is if two patentees have complementary patents that block both from developing a new 
invention. A cross-licensing occurs when the patentees reciprocally allow each the use of 
their blocking technologies, thus untangling any patent thicket that may hinder innovation.416 
Commentators such as Shapiro have extolled the virtues of cross-licensing as a means to 
reduce the harmful effects of patent thickets by making bilateral licensing unnecessary in a 
blocking situation.417  
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Cross-licensing as a method to deal with potential SynBio has its limits. Although cross-
licensing requires simpler arrangements than pure bilateral licensing, it still is inherently 
bilateral. Cross-licensing implies the negotiation of a series of agreements between varying 
upstream patentees, resulting in a tangled web of contractual arrangements that is 
complicated to manage.418 In second, it also requires that each new upstream innovator 
engages in a series of such bilateral negotiations, thus not resolving the issue of transaction 
costs inherent in fragmentation and overlap. However, it would be incorrect to state that 
cross-licensing has no effect on such costs. Shapiro has highlighted the fact that any 
successful cross-licensing arrangement will reduce the bargaining costs viz. a normal 
licensing situation.419 In third, cross-licenses are only useful in the same level of cumulative 
innovation, as a new downstream developer might not have any patents to cross-license.420 
Given the cumulative nature of synthetic biology as discussed in section 4.4.2., it is likely 
that many downstream developers of synthetic biology will not benefit from cross-licensing. 
Furthermore, real life arrangements have a tendency not to be purely bilateral. As an 
example, the triple thicket model developed and studied by von Graevenitz et al. has a 
configuration in which bilateral cross-licensing is insufficient means to resolve blocking 
patents: even if two parties conclude such an arrangement, the third party in the triple may 
still block any applications developed by the cross-licensing parties.421 Given the prevalence 
of patent triples in certain precursor industries of synthetic biology422, emphasizing cross-
licensing as a solution is unlikely to result in significant progress. Compounding this issue 
is the fact that the triple thicket is a simplistic representation of patent thickets. Instead of a 
trilateral blocking situation, any number of patentees might find themselves in a reciprocal 
blocking situation, requiring an N-lateral cross-license in order for the thicket to be resolved. 
Based on the argumentation above, it can be concluded that cross-licensing alone is 
insufficient as a means for the free market to solve the potential issues of fragmentation and 
overlap arising in synthetic biology. It might be a useful tool in resolving certain simple 
blocking situations in the technological upstream, but insufficient as a remedy for the 
underlying problems. 
                                                 
418 N.B.: Shapiro 2001, p. 130 discusses the existence of such cross-licensing webs, but concludes that their 
advantages are empirically verifiable. This notion can be accepted while emphasizing the fact that they 
nevertheless are not the ideal solution. 
419 Idem. p. 129–130. 
420 van Zimmeren et al. 2011, p. 570. 
421 von Graevenitz et al. 2011, p. 9. 
422 See e.g.: von Graevenitz et al. 2011, p. 10, Table 1; UKIPO Patent Thicket Study 2013, p. 53.  
69 
 
6.1.2. Patent pools 
A more refined solution is to adopt a collaborative licensing model that effectively 
aggregates patent rights into a patent pool.423 Patent pools are similar to cross-licensing in 
that they consist of two or more patent holders granting each other licenses to one or more 
of their patents.424 The difference to cross-licensing arises from the fact that it is not an ad 
hoc solution between two patentees. The patents are pooled in a way which allows them to 
be licensed to third parties as a complete package.425 Depending on the structural 
arrangement desired by the founders of the pool, licenses to the entire bundle of patents may 
be granted either directly by the patentees or indirectly, in which case it is usual for an 
institutionally separate entity to manage both the patent pool and the granting of licenses to 
the pooled technologies.426 Patent pools have been created in the life sciences, although with 
variable success. One such example is the BIO Ventures for Global Health pool for patents 
relating to neglected tropical diseases.427 
It is generally accepted that patent pools improve welfare only if they contain 
complementary patents.428 If a patent pool fulfils that requirement, they are a considerably 
more effective way of addressing potential patent fragmentation in SynBio than cross-
licensing. Instead of having to negotiate a multitude of license agreements for e.g. 
proprietarty bioparts, a downstream innovator could obtain the necessary rights from a “one-
stop shop”429, consequently reducing the potential for royalty stacking and hold-up.430 
Additionally, downstream innovators would not need to expend an inordinate amount of 
time tracking down both the relevant patents and their owners, thus reducing search costs. A 
single license to a bundle of upstream patents also naturally reduces bargaining costs.431 
However, it would be naïve to conclude that a synthetic biology patent pool would constitute 
a panacea to fragmentation and overlap, transaction costs, and collective action problems. 
Instead of resolving these issues once and for all, the creation of such a pool might merely 
push the strategic and structural issues one step back. In first, a patent pools typically contain 
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patents in the same level of cumulative innovation432, meaning that they primarily address 
issues of horizontal fragmentation. Parisi et al. have shown that strategies and tools for 
managing horizontal fragmentation do not necessarily resolve vertical fragmentation.433 This 
implies that in fields of cumulative innovation, such as synthetic biology, multiple patent 
pools would need to be established for different levels of technological development, such 
as for enabling technologies, standards, biopart libraries, et cetera. The issue of collective 
action is not necessarily resolved by patent pools either. Participation in a patent pool entails 
opportunity costs, as a participant must effectively relinquish control of some of their 
patents, reducing their potential to extract holdup-type rents.434 Following the logic of the 
game theoretical presentation in chapter 5.3., the participants have the exact same strategic 
incentives to maximize any benefits arising from the pool while minimizing their costs. This 
can potentially lead to three distinct collective action problems.  
The first problem is that a participant in a patent pool agreement has the incentive of adding 
the absolute minimal amount of valuable patents to the pool, all the while hoping to benefit 
from the contributions of other participants and the possible network effects it might 
generate.435 If the situation is symmetric for all participants, the result may be a pool that 
contains little to no valuable patents, essentially resulting in a “market for lemons” as defined 
by Akelof.436 This has been a concern with existing patent pools in the life sciences.437  
In second, strategic behavior in the period preceding and coinciding both with cross-
licensing or the creation of a patent pool may also exacerbate fragmentation and overlap. As 
an example, one way for a patentee to provide sufficient material to warrant the cross-license 
inherent in both arrangements is to engage in portfolio aggregation.438 This implies a 
situation in which a patentee, instead of applying for a single patent containing multiple 
innovative technologies, seeks as many individual patents for their innovations as possible 
in order to inflate their patent portfolios and consequently improve their bargaining 
position.439 This may worsen the lemons market problem discussed above, while resulting 
in no appreciable change in the underlying problem of patent fragmentation.  
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The third problem has to do with the formation of the pool itself. Even if the issues discussed 
above were resolved, it might be strategically optimal for a patentee not to participate in the 
pool at all.440 If the prospect of pooled patents offered at reasonable royalty rates generates 
sufficient interest in downstream developers to engage in a project that requires the pooled 
patents as inputs, a patentee possessing a blocking patent that has not been included in the 
pool would be able to demand extortionate royalties for the last missing piece of the upstream 
patent puzzle.441 Continuing with the assumption that the situation is symmetric for all 
potential participants of the pool results in no pooling of patents. The intractable nature of 
these three collective action problems indicates that pools are a valuable tool, but in order 
for them to function, (supra)governmental actors should consider intervening in the market 
to force optimal collective action, namely to impose the TFT contingent strategy. The 
methods of doing so will be discussed in section 6.2.2. 
6.1.3. Patent clearinghouses 
Another way of approaching the issue is to create a patent clearinghouse for synthetic 
biology. Patent clearinghouses are institutions which seek to match patentees with licensees 
in an effective manner442, broadly similar to how clearinghouses act as an intermediary 
between buyers and sellers in the financial industry. This model has distinct benefits in 
relation to synthetic biology. First, Aoki and Schiff have shown that clearinghouses often 
generate all-important network effects.443 Second, Falce has noted that clearinghouses have 
a special capacity in attracting SMEs, resulting in the formation of a system that is akin to a 
commons.444 Given the relevance of the commons approach in synthetic biology, a 
clearinghouse for the IP frame could be beneficial, as it would mirror the general approach 
of the A2K model, thus raising the possibility of increased compatibility between the two. 
In her study on the forms of clearinghouses prevalent in the life sciences industry in general, 
van Overwalle distinguishes between four functionally different types of clearinghouses: 
information clearinghouses, technology exchange clearinghouses, standardized license 
clearinghouses, and royalty collection clearinghouses. Each of these models have different 
economic implications in managing the costs generated by fragmentation and overlap. 
                                                 
440 Aoki & Schiff 2008, p. 201. 
441 Idem. 
442 Van Overwalle 2016, p. 12. 
443 Aoki & Schiff 2008, p. 200. 
444 Falce 2011, p. 51–52. 
72 
 
Information clearinghouses are the simplest of the aforementioned systems. They seek to 
provide a platform for the sharing and exchange of technical knowledge or information 
relating to the proprietary status of that knowledge.445 This definition includes all registries 
operated by patent authorities. This type of clearinghouse has the benefit of reducing the 
search costs engendered by fragmentation by providing downstream patentees with a means 
to seek out the relevant patents. 
Technology exchange clearinghouses provide a platform for patentees to essentially 
advertise their patents to potential licensees. A technology exchange clearinghouse collects 
a listing of such technologies, enabling downstream developers to consult a single resource 
on what technologies and patents might be relevant, as well as the contact information of the 
licensor of that technology.446 In addition, a technology exchange may provide some 
additional facilities that engender cooperation, such as providing model licensing 
agreements for parties to utilize.447A prominent example of a technology exchange 
clearinghouse in the life sciences is the WIPO Re:Search platform.448  This type of 
clearinghouse may reduce transaction costs to a greater extent than an information 
clearinghouse by further reducing search costs, as well as possibly limiting some of the 
duplication of licensing arrangements. 
Standardized license clearinghouses builds upon technology exchange clearinghouses by 
providing the opportunity to directly license the patented technologies listed in the 
clearinghouse.449 The term ‘standard’ does not imply an identical license agreement for all 
instances, instead referring to a type of modular licensing agreement, containing a range of 
pre-prepared options that the licensors and licensees may use to construct a license.450 
Examples of such arrangements include Librassay, a standardized license clearinghouse 
operated by the private company MPEG LA, which offers access to patents involving tests 
relating to personalized medicine.451 This system has the benefit of drastically reducing 
transaction costs by both reducing the search costs involved in locating relevant patents, as 
well as the bargaining costs by removing the need to negotiate separate licenses.  
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One final form described by van Overwalle is the royalty clearinghouse, which combines 
the functions of all of the above, as well as manages the royalty fees involved in the licensing 
agreements. It is conceptually very similar to how performance rights organizations, such as 
the Finnish Teosto, operate in issues relating to copyright.452 However, van Overwalle states 
that no such organizations currently exist within the life sciences.453 
The most notable effect of the clearinghouse models is their capability to reduce transaction 
costs.454  However, the models presented above generally leave the underlying patent 
landscape fragmented, resulting in their general inadequacy as solutions to potential royalty 
stacking in the synthetic biology downstream.455 Compared to the first two models, a 
standardized license clearinghouse and royalty clearinghouse have the benefit of addressing 
patent hold up to some extent, as they effectively remove the possibility for strategic 
bargaining on part of the patentees. As a form of license marketplace, clearinghouses may 
also be capable of ameliorating the search costs that are specific to cumulative innovation 
by providing a coherent sources of information on enabling technologies, thus reducing some 
of the detrimental aspects of vertical fragmentation. Despite their promise, scholars have 
raised concerns regarding the viability of most clearinghouses in the life sciences (save for 
information clearinghouses), as the reduction in bargaining power leads to similar incentive 
problems as in patent pools, possibly resulting again in a “market for lemons”.456 As with 
patent pools, possible solutions to this problem will be discussed in section 6.2.2. 
6.1.4. Competition policy in relation to the pooling of patents 
Both scholars and legislators have noted that aligning the incentives of competing innovators 
through cross-licensing or patent pools has the potential to result in anti-competitive 
behavior.457 In this vein, it is vital to note that TFEU Article 101(1) prohibits: 
“[A]ll agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the internal market, and in particular those which limit… (b)…technical 
development…” 
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TFEU Article 101(3) delineates the scope of this prohibition by allowing agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices of undertakings which contribute to promoting technical 
and economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. Such 
agreements, decisions, and practices may not impose restrictions that are not indispensable 
or allow the undertaking to eliminate competition. The European Commission has clarified 
the exact relationship of the aforementioned norms by issuing the Block Exemption 
Regulation (EU) No. 316/2014 on Technology Transfer Agreements (TTBER)458 and the 
communication on Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the TFEU to Technology 
Transfer Agreements (TTA Guidelines)459.  As a general point, it must be noted that 
paragraph 247 of the TTA Guidelines specifically states that TTBER does not apply to 
‘technology pools’, which is the phrase used in the document to denote patent pools.460 
Paragraph 291 of the TTA Guidelines contains a safe harbor provision regarding the creation 
and operation of patent pools. It creates seven conditions for a patent pool which must be 
fulfilled in order for the pool to be fall beyond the scope of TFEU Article 101(3). These 
conditions are: 1) participation in the patent pool must be open to all interested parties, 2) 
safeguards that ensure the inclusion of only essential technologies into the pool must be 
placed, 3) safeguards that restrict the exchange of sensitive information that is not relevant 
for the operation or creation of the pool must be adopted, 4) licensing technologies into the 
pool happens non-exclusively, 5) licensing out of the pool follows fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms, 6) the right of challenging the validity and essentiality of 
the technologies is not restricted, and 7) contributors and licensees to the pool are allowed 
to develop competing technologies. 
Paragraphs 250–255 of the TTA Guidelines discuss the nature of the technologies included 
in patent pools and their potentially anti-competitive effects. Paragraph 255 provides that 
forming technology pools that contain mostly substitute technologies will generally be 
considered as a violation of TFEU Article 101(3), as coordinating the licensing of substitute 
technologies may easily amount to price fixing. In this respect, it also must be noted that 
point 2 of the safe harbor gives reason to pause, given that it specifically refers to essential 
technologies. The definitions contained in paragraphs 251 and 252 essentially equate these 
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terms, by defining both as technologies that are required or essential “to produce a particular 
product or carry out a particular process to which the pooled technologies relate”. 
This results in a crucial concern: while generally complementary, it is not altogether clear 
whether all patents on the elements of the bioparts approach are essential as meant in the 
Guidelines. As an example, it might be advantageous to pool IP relating to various forms of 
minimal genome chassis so that a downstream developer may test the efficacy of their 
biosystem implementation in multiple chassis. Different chassis exhibit codon bias, meaning 
that they have a tendency to favor certain codons over synonymous ones when encoding 
mRNA, which has implications for the functioning and design of biosystems.461 Given that 
it is still possible to use a non-optimal chassis for a biosystem462, are the chassis considered 
substitutes? Luckily, paragraphs 254 and 255 provide that distinctions between complements 
and substitutes are not clear cut, thus allowing certain levels of overlap between the concepts. 
Paragraph 254 states that if bundling partial substitutes results in efficiency benefits that the 
licensees might require, the technologies are treated as complements. Additional indications 
for efficiency include that individual licensing is allowed both by the participants and the 
pool in general, and the total royalties to all the individual licenses do not exceed the royalties 
charged by the pool.   
It can be therefore be concluded that if synthetic biology matures into a properly modular 
technology, the creation of patent pools to facilitate downstream development is not ex ante 
prohibited. However, given the nature of partial substitutability, it would be wise for such 
pools to be constructed following the norms set out in paragraph 254 of the TTA Guidelines. 
It must also be noted that the TTA Guidelines contain a wealth of other provisions that are 
relevant to the formation of synthetic biology patent pools (paragraphs 244–273), but these 
matters cannot be addressed within the scope of this thesis. 
6.1.3. Summation on the topic of market tools 
Based on the discussion above, it is possible to state that the free market has somewhat 
sufficient means of managing potential fragmentation arising from the patenting of SynBio 
inventions, as well as mitigating overlap to some extent. The analysis has also shown that 
that free market tools have their limits. First of all, they may be incapable of solving certain 
collective action problems inherent in the creation of patent pools and clearinghouses. As 
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discussed in section 5.3., one possible solution for those problems is to enforce collective 
action through institutional means, which denotes either changes to patent policy, generating 
further incentives through e.g. fiscal incentives, or even passing entirely new legislation that 
mandates certain behavior. These measures will be addressed in the following chapter. 
Despite the possible need to introduce institutional measures to fix incentive problems in the 
free market, it should be highlighted that the actors in the SynBio industry should take it 
upon themselves to further fix these issues. In this vein, Henkel and Reitzig put forth a 
convincing argument that the IP market actors themselves must understand the detrimental 
nature of abusing both the patent system and technology exchange regulations.463 They 
advocate the following measures464: 1) high-technology firms should cease the construction 
of inflated patent portfolios, 2) firms must simplify standards and increase modularity of 
design, 3) innovators must begin cooperation in the early phase of their R&D processes, 4) 
companies must maintain a high level of interdepartmental and intercompany cooperation, 
and 5) stop unnecessary patenting altogether.465  
Regardless of whether these incentive problems are fixed through institutional intervention 
or the SynBio patentees own volition, it is still necessary to formulate an ideal patent 
management structure that may serve as a goal for such efforts. As indicated by the 
discussion in the preceding sections of this chapter, both patent pools and clearinghouses 
have their benefits: patent pools may be efficient tools in managing horizontal fragmentation, 
although having a somewhat weaker effect in vertical fragmentation. Clearinghouses 
primarily engender benefits by reducing the transaction costs involved in downstream 
development, with some additional effects on vertical fragmentation. It is worth noting that 
the 2014 OECD SynBio Report advocates the creation of a synthetic biology clearinghouse 
that would register synthetic biology inventions, which could subsequently be licensed to 
users directly.466  However, this model does not address horizontal fragmentation 
particularly well. In her study on both institutions, van Overwalle discusses the intriguing 
notion of combining both patent pools and clearinghouses into a hybrid model.467 Especially 
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noteworthy is her comment on the MPP pool, which acts as a “type of ‘supermarket’ for a 
variety of disease related patents”468. 
Such a hybrid could potentially be the ideal model for synthetic biology as well, as it would 
have the potential to limit the effects of both horizontal and vertical fragmentation. One 
model that has seemingly not been considered at all in the literature is the notion of pooling 
multiple registries of bioparts and related technologies into separate patent pools, which 
could then centrally be administered through a clearinghouse. As an idealized example of 
this model, it is possible to imagine the following: patent pools A-D would be for proprietary 
biopart libraries, patent pool E would be for standard-essential patents, whereas patent pool 
F would be for patents on SynBio-specific research tools and other enabling technologies. 
The central clearinghouse, such as either a technology exchange or, ideally, a standardized 
license clearinghouse as in the OECD suggestions, would effectively connect these pools 
into a single resource, thus reducing the effects of both horizontal and vertical fragmentation. 
Such an arrangement would also reduce search costs, as a new developer would be able to 
search the clearinghouse to locate the necessary pooled patents quickly and efficiently. If the 
central clearinghouse is of the standardized license variety, the downstream developer would 
be able to obtain a license without having to engage in protracted negotiations. An additional 
benefit to this model is that it can be built incrementally through a primary stage of pooling 
the relevant patents, followed by the creation of the clearinghouse as a central institution 
connecting them all.  
It is submitted that this would be the ideal free-market solution for the IP frame of synthetic 
biology, as it reduces both forms of fragmentation as well as reduces the effects of overlap, 
minimizing the potential of royalty stacking and patent hold-up, as well as reducing 
transaction costs considerably. As it arises naturally from the basic problem itself, it is 
surprising that it has not been suggested before now. However, its formation is contingent 
on solving the aforementioned problems inherent in patent pools. Furthermore, combining a 
standard license of modular optionality with the structure of a patent pool is by no means a 
simple proposition due to the aforementioned restrictions generated by EU competition law. 
Determining the feasibility of this model warrant further study in this respect.   
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6.2. Patent policy tools 
As indicated by the discussion above, the free market has the correct tools to create a 
functional SynBio IP model that addresses fragmentation, but possibly lack incentives to do 
so. If an economically functional combinatory model of patent pools and clearinghouses 
were constructed, institutional involvement would be necessary to solve the incentive 
problems inherent in patent pools and clearinghouses. Furthermore, relying solely on the 
free market to manage anticommons and patent thickets is unlikely to solve the fundamental 
issue of overlap.469 This section seeks to cover both aspects of future patent policy. 
6.2.1. Resolving patent overlap 
As stated in several previous instances, resolving the patent overlap requires institutional 
action on part of the patent authority. One of the primary causes of overlapping patent claims 
is insufficient prior art research, both on the part of the applicant, as well as the patent 
authority themselves.470 It is self-evident that applicants do not wish to expend any more 
resources in conducting such searches than absolutely necessary, but insufficient searches 
by the patent office are of greater concern. In his analysis on the matter, Lemley argues that 
patent offices are in fact “rationally ignorant” in not examining claims thoroughly, resulting 
in an overall lack of precise knowledge on the contents of prior art and existing patent 
claims.471 It should however be noted that Lemley’s criticisms were specifically directed 
towards the USPTO, although they are to some extent generalizable. 
Prior art searches conducted by the EPO are generally accepted as being relatively good472, 
but EPO Guideline B-III 2.1. contains an explicit acknowledgement that such measures are 
not always perfect. Even if a thorough search were to be conducted, there is always a chance 
that some prima facie unrelated patent contains-subject matter that overlaps with a patent 
application. In such situations, it is difficult for the authority themselves to notice potential 
overlap given the technical limitations of information search tools. This problem has both 
an ex ante and ex post solution; ex ante stricter interpretation of the criteria of patentability 
resulting in the narrowing of claims coupled with more thorough prior art searches, or ex 
post through post-grant opposition proceedings.473 
                                                 
469 See: last paragraph of Section 4.3.1. 
470 Shapiro 2001, p. 125. 
471 Lemley 2001, passim. 
472 Chien & Kesan 2016, passim. 
473 Burk & Lemley 2003, p. 23. 
79 
 
Regarding the former, it must be stated that the EPO is not oblivious to the general cases of 
anticommons and patent thickets, with multiple studies conducted on how to best manage 
them. A 2012 EPO report suggests that managing patent overlap ex ante is one of the prime 
motives to increase overall patent quality.474 The report agrees with Lemley’s assessment in 
that increased prior art search costs lead to both overlapping claims in patent applications, 
as well as in difficulties for the examining board to notice the overlap in their prior art.475 A 
similar 2013 EPO report identifies specific problems in the granting of European patents that 
promote the generation of patent thickets. Importantly, the report also offers some 
interrelated suggestions on how to fix these issues, granting high importance to improving 
the overall quality of patents, resulting in clearer boundaries between patents.476 To this end, 
it also discusses further grant additional resources to examination to locate overlapping 
claims more efficiently477, as well as means of reducing the total number of applications 
through a re-structuring of the costs of patent applications.478 Overall, these measures will 
likely reduce not only overlap, but through effectively reducing the amount of patents 
granted, they will address fragmentation concerns as well. If implemented, they should 
provide a working ex ante solution for patent overlap. 
The ex post opposition solution builds on Articles 99–103 of the EPC.479 Article 99(1) 
provides anyone with the possibility to commence opposition proceedings up to nine months 
after the granting of the patent. EPC Article 100(a) provides that grounds for opposition 
include non-patentability of the subject-matter by virtue of it lacking one or more of the 
criteria of patentability contained in EPC Articles 52–57. As the question at hand is overlap, 
the most relevant criteria is novelty. Article 101 provides the actual remedies for successful 
opposition proceedings: revocation (Art. 101 (2.a)) or amending the patent (Art. 101 (3.a)). 
Article 99(2) provides that such remedies will have unitary effect in the contracting states in 
which the patent is in effect. 
While undoubtedly a possibility, such opposition proceedings may prove to be economically 
problematic as a systemic solution. Thambisetty highlights the notion that in any 
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adjudicative action that results in the invalidity of the patent, the subsequent invalidity of the 
patent is essentially a public good.  The party seeking to invalidate the patent must bear the 
high costs of the invalidation process, with the other being able to freeride on the outcome.480 
In second, an unsuccessful attack on an existing patent may result in unfavorable outcomes, 
such as harsher licensing terms. As the cost of the royalties are likely passed at least partially 
to end consumers, this may result in higher prices and lower aggregate welfare.481 To frame 
these conclusions in terms used previously: relying on free market actors to manage overlap 
in this manner results in a renewed collective action problem. Furthermore, solving that 
collective action problem is much more difficult than the version of solving fragmentation 
through patent pooling, as patent pooling results in a coherent bundle of private property, 
whereas an invalidated patent is a public good. There is no clear way for the opposing parties 
to appropriate the results of their efforts. The 2013 EPO report raises similar concerns, 
offering a multitude of possible solutions that include improving the opposition procedure, 
introducing better litigation systems, and better alternative dispute resolution.482 However, 
the report itself indicates that effectuating all of the solutions discussed does not fall within 
the strict purview of the EPO483, thus making it less likely that changes in EPO patent policy 
may provide a functional ex ante remedy to the problem of overlap. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the simplest solution for managing any synthetic biology patent 
overlap in Europe must build upon institutional safeguards in the EPO patenting process 
itself. The measures suggested by the EPO seem sufficient, provided that they manage to 
maintain high standards of quality when faced with novel complex technologies, such as 
synthetic biology. In this vein, Robienski and Simon argue that it is unlikely that regulators 
will be especially challenged by the technical aspects specific to synthetic biology.484 
6.2.2. Encouraging collective action 
As discussed in sections 6.1.2–3, free market tools may mitigate fragmentation, but they 
suffer from a variety of incentive problems. The specific forms of incentive problem 
mentioned in that context were 1) ‘market for lemons’-effect, 2) portfolio building, and 3) 
remaining outside the pool to extract holdup rents (generally referred to as patent 
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ambush)485. Given the systemic nature of these problems, it is difficult to see how the free 
market could resolve them independently. Scholars have suggested various forms of 
institutional intervention to ameliorate these problems.  
First is the issue of the ‘lemons market’. Van Zimmeren et al. have noted that this arises 
from a difficulty to obtain a critical mass of quality patents through voluntary participation 
of the patentees.486 This implies that patentees might wish to benefit from a patent pool with 
a critical mass of valuable patents, but the coordination costs of the first movers may be too 
high. One possibility of resolving the issue would be to forcibly appropriate the patented 
technologies by means of compulsory licenses. Commentators have argued that that this 
approach is deeply problematic, as a trigger-happy policy of compulsory licensing may 
disincentivize innovation altogether.487 One of the few legal scholars involved in synthetic 
biology that has addressed the issue of compulsory licensing is de Miguel Beriain, who 
argues that introducing compulsory licensing to manage potential obstruction in SynBio 
innovation “will definitely ruin any private investment in this market”.488  
A softer approach is possible. As evidenced by the participants in an EU-wide coordinated 
research effort on synthetic biology, ERASynBio, a great deal of synthetic biology research 
in Europe is conducted by publicly funded institutions, such as universities and national 
research academies.489 As such institutions are not as reliant on market forces in their 
decision-making, it is possible for these institutions to take a policy stance of accruing their 
SynBio patents into a patent pool. Furthermore, public institutions may offer a credible ex 
ante commitment to maintain low royalty rates for such a pool, which Lévêque and Ménière 
argue will spur the growth of the pool even further.490 In a similar vein, Carbone et al. argue 
that universities must take a more pro-active approach to disseminate the genetic 
technologies they have developed, as not doing so will easily lead to the exclusion of low-
margin actors within an industry.491 
Second is the portfolio issue. In their analysis, Weber and Parchomovsky present multiple 
solutions to the inflation of patent portfolios. Most noteworthy in this discussion are 
differential fees, in which patenting fees are partially determined by the size of the 
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applicants’ portfolio,492 and increased disclosure requirements, which result in patents being 
granted only if they provide a sufficiently complete picture of the technology.493 Very similar 
ideas were raised in the 2012494 and 2013495 EPO reports, which indicates that the EPO has 
at least considered such proposals. Given the similar nature of the questions, i.e. ensuring 
high quality patents, the portfolio issue may be addressed in conjunction with adopting the 
policies discussed in the previous section.  
Patent ambush is a more complex issue, as it encroaches on the fundamental requirements 
of technology exchanges in the TTA Guidelines. Scholars have offered various solutions to 
this problem, with various degrees of potential. One such solution was presented by Klaus 
Schmidt, who recommends the following: if an essential technology is not included into the 
patent pool, the pool agreement is not valid.496 This essentially means forcing a grim 
contingent strategy in solving the collective action problem. However, as stated previously, 
Axelrod has shown that such a solution is not optimal in terms of total welfare. Furthermore, 
it would be positively disastrous for synthetic biology patent pools, as it would be impossible 
to maintain such a level of essentiality given the potential for partial substitutability.  
Other, less destructive measures exist. One commonly discussed option is the inclusion of 
so-called grantback clauses into the patent pool agreements, which generally denote an 
assurance on part of the either the participants or the licensees of the pool (or both) to license 
any upcoming essential technologies to the participants of the pool at FRAND terms.497 This 
is a very effective tool in removing any incentive that a producing entity might have to hold 
out patents, as doing so would preclude them from participation in the pool altogether. The 
EPO 2013 report includes an additional suggestion to have some form of fiscal incentives 
for patentees that participate in patent pools.498 It is likely that resolving potential patent 
ambushes will require a combined approach of specifically tailored incentives, which 
requires further economic modelling combined with empiric studies. Such studies are 
seemingly few and far between.  
One last thing must be noted on this issue: not all patentees are necessarily producing entities. 
In the case of PAEs, who merely wish to extract royalties and consequently have no clear 
                                                 
492 Weber and Parchomovsky 2005, p. 68–69. 
493 Idem. p. 69–71. 
494 EPO ESAB Report 2012, p. 16. 
495 EPO ESAB Report 2013, p. 12. 
496 Schmidt, K. 2010, p. 15–18. 
497 Merges 1999, p. 35–37. 
498 EPO ESAB Report 2013, p. 13 
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motivation to even participate in a patent pool, other measures are possibly required, such as 
compulsory licensing of PAE holdouts. Unfortunately, given the extreme complexity and 
fragmentation of the European compulsory licensing systems499, they cannot be discussed 
further. It should be noted that since patent trolls rely fundamentally on injunctions to force 
the payment of high royalties500, their effects can be mitigated through a rational structuring 
of the UPC. Further alleviating the problem is that European systems do not generally grant 
injunctions for infringing standard-essential patents unless the infringing party refuses to 
accept a FRAND license,501 resulting in a marked decrease for the potential of PAEs to 
extract hold-up type rents by acquiring patents on fundamental SynBio infrastructure. 
6.2.3. Managing PAEs 
Robienski et al. note that while cross licensing, patent pools, and patent clearinghouses may 
certainly assist in reducing the problems of fragmentation and overlap, they are insufficient 
measures to provide an effective solutions. They highlight similar concerns as raised in 
previous sections of this thesis regarding the misaligned incentive structures of a) patent 
holders that engage in downstream development themselves and b) non-producing entities 
(the aforementioned ‘patent trolls’).502 Following a similar logic leads Lemley and Shapiro 
to emphasize the strategic difficulty of getting non-producing entities to join in patent 
pools.503 This discussion regarding managing the PAE problem will be divided into both this 
section and the subsequent one, with this one concentrating on more general issues, whereas 
the next one addresses the specific problem of PAEs in relation to patent pools. 
One commonly raised concern pertains to the advent of the UPC, as it can conceivably 
provide patent trolls with a unified European forum to seek continent-wide injunctions and 
damages for the infringement of unitary patents.504 UPCA Article 32(c) and (f) do 
theoretically provide this opportunity. Compounding the concerns relating to injunctions is 
the fact that the proposed UPC system follows the German model, in which injunctions can 
be granted prior to assessing whether the patent is even valid.505  
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500 Gabison 2015, p. 286–287. 
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505 EC PAE Study 2016, p. 42. 
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Several studies have been conducted that address this very question, often including 
comparisons of both the national court systems of Europe and the likely UPCA system with 
the respective patent infringement litigation procedures in the United States. Such studies 
tend to emphasize the fact that US patent trolls are generally considered to be a major 
problem in innovative industries506, with as much as 60% of all patent litigation being 
generated by them.507 One such study by Harhoff identifies several factors that have 
promoted deleterious PAE activity in the United States, the most important of which are high 
costs of legal action which are generally allocated to both parties, contingency fee payments 
for legal representation, high damage awards, a patentee friendly legal system, low quality 
of examination, extension of patent rights to subject-matter not considered patentable in 
Europe, and formerly, a high likelihood of obtaining an injunction if infringement was 
suspected.508 However, empirical studies have shown that the situation is not as dire in 
Europe. A study by Helmers et al. shows that 11% of patent suits filed in the UK between 
2000 and 2010 originated from non-producing entities509, which is the hypernym that 
includes the aforementioned PAEs. The study does however show that such suits are most 
common in patents relating to high-tech inventions.510 
What explains the marked difference between the US and Europe in the prevalence of PAEs? 
Harhoff shows that in regard to the aforementioned promoting effects, the European system 
is very dissimilar to the US one, most importantly in that the loser generally bears the costs 
of litigation, and European systems generally do not contain so-called treble damages.511 An 
extensive study conducted under the auspices of the European Commission alleviates these 
fears further by stating inter alia that the European patent system manages patent quality 
better than the US system, and European courts tend to be overall more critical of injunctive 
measures. Furthermore, seeking unitary injunctions carries the risk of exposing the potential 
invalidity of the patent, and the European “loser pays”-system is likely to disincentivize 
patent trolls altogether.512 The study does conclude that PAEs will likely be active 
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immediately after the creation of the UPC to test the system, but they will find it difficult to 
adapt their business models to fit the European standards.513 
Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that the advent of the UPC will likely 
have little effect in the way of fostering patentee behavior that is detrimental to the 
development of synthetic biology. Given the relatively minor role that patent trolls have 
played in the European patent landscape, their effect on European SynBio innovation is 
likely to be minimal, thus alleviating the concerns of scholars such as Robienski. As stated 
in the EC report, this is naturally contingent on the UPC adopting sufficiently stringent 
criteria when evaluating issues such as the granting of temporary injunctions.514 The UPC 
organization seems to be well aware of such concerns, even addressing them on their 
website.515 An interesting question in this respect is whether the UPC will adopt the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ on the intellectual property related provisions of TJEU Articles 101 
and 102, which together have been used as a means for putative infringers to argue against 
abusive licensing practices regarding patents that confer market dominance.516 However, 
that is a question for another study.   
6.3. Considerations de lege ferenda  
Evaluating the conclusions of the chapter so far leads to the conclusion that neither free 
market actors nor patent policymakers will likely find the current framework of IP legislation 
and competition law insufficient in dealing with the challenges posed synthetic biology. 
Even if the legislative frame is largely sufficient in ensuring the viability of synthetic 
biology, doing so in practice requires that both the developers of synthetic biology as well 
as the institutions charged with managing patent policy take action in effectuating the 
recommendations described above.  
There is however one issue that has been discussed in this work which is not sufficiently 
addressed by current legislation. Referring back to section 4.4., if bioparts become truly 
standardized and modular, the ‘reasonable expectation of success’ doctrine of the EPO may 
prove problematic for the developers of downstream applications of synthetic biology. 
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Because of the entrenched position of this doctrine in EPO law and its importance for issues 
outside synthetic biology, any de lege ferenda suggestion to modify the standard, if one were 
to be implemented, would likely to result in far-reaching and unpredictable outcomes. As 
this thesis aims for simple solutions that do not disrupt the current patent system excessively, 
an alternative method of resolving the issue is needed. 
6.3.1. Harmonized utility model protection 
A natural candidate for resolving the issue is utility model (UM) protection. Utility models 
are a means to obtain IP protection for inventions that fall short of the strict subject-matter 
criteria inherent in the European patent system.517 UMs are broadly similar to patents in that 
most European countries utilize similar subject-matter criteria for both utility models and 
patents, but only consider some of those criteria, or use lower standards in evaluating 
them.518 As an example, while novelty is a criterion for obtaining a UM, this requirement is 
not necessarily absolute. Depending on the European nation in question, utility models may 
require absolute novelty, such as provided in section 2 of the Finnish Utility Model Act.519 
As a counterexample, Article 145.1 of the Spanish Patent Act520 states that novelty is 
assessed based on prior disclosure in Spain alone.  The greatest difference between utility 
models and patents is that the former are generally not examined by the granting authority.521 
In evaluating the aforementioned criteria, the granting authority relies primarily on 
disclosure by the applicant. The overall ease of obtaining utility models is compensated by 
the fact that the period of protection they offer is usually considerably shorter than that of 
patents522,  with between seven to ten years being the most common period.523 
As utility models are easier to obtain and generally cost less, Minssen et al. have suggested 
that a harmonized European approach in utility model protection would generally promote 
innovation in European synthetic biology, as small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) would be 
able to obtain protections for their innovations for relatively low costs. 524   
A shared form of utility model protection arising from EU legislation would have the benefit 
of offering a partial solution to the issue arising from the ‘reasonable expectation of success’ 
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doctrine in EPO patent law, as the EPO does not concern itself with utility models. This 
would provide downstream SynBio innovators with the necessary incentives to develop even 
quite simple commercial applications by allowing them to recoup their development and 
licensing costs. This would also be acceptable in terms of the general logic of IPR protection 
by acknowledging the fact that a relatively straightforward assembling of bioparts is not 
innovative enough to warrant 20 years of exclusivity through traditional patent protection. 
A harmonized UM framework is also required by the fact that Member states that have 
adopted UM legislation have generally included very different approaches regarding 
biotechnological inventions. As an example, section 6(1.2) of the Estonian Utility Model 
Act provides that biotechnological inventions may not be granted UM s. 
It should be noted that the European Commission proposed a directive harmonization of 
utility model protection in 1997, which was subsequently updated in 1999. This approach 
was suspended in the year 2000 and finally abandoned in 2006 due to lack of consensus.525 
It may be the opportune time to revisit the matter. As it currently stands, the specific case of 
synthetic biology by itself is likely insufficient to warrant renewed harmonization efforts for 
utility model protection. Nonetheless, it does serve as a compelling example of one of many 
complex technologies that would benefit from such harmonization. The primary message 
and de lege ferenda proposal arising from this particular discussion is that biotechnological 
inventions should be included within the scope of any future utility model protection.   
It is necessary to include one caveat: given the general ease of obtaining a UM, great care 
must be taken that granting them to minor inventions in synthetic biology does not create a 
utility model anticommons and thicket on top of what was previously discussed in regards to 
patenting. While in no way relating to the European development of synthetic biology, 
commentators have discussed the emergence of such utility model thickets in China526, 
indicating that they are at least a conceptual possibility. One quite invasive way to solve the 
problem would be to include a provision in the prospective directive that requires FRAND 
licensing of all utility modes. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, its purpose was to study the compatibility of 
synthetic biology with existing European patent law, especially with regards to the latter’s 
capability of generating efficient solutions that would ensure the viability of the technology. 
While attempting to address this problem, this work wound up covering multiple issues that 
have not been discussed by scholars of the field so far, except for analogous situations in the 
precursors of synthetic biology. The implications of the substantive rules of patentability of 
the EPC on the development of synthetic biology have been discussed in other work, but 
usually focusing on a very specific issue. Second is an approach that builds on empirical 
similarities between synthetic biology and its precursors. Third is a more thorough analysis 
of the market tools for addressing fragmentation and overlap as they relate specifically to 
synthetic biology. Fourth is the implications of European competition law on the viability of 
those market tools. To my knowledge, the last issue has remained totally in the dark so far. 
While researching these issues, an extremely broad field of inquiry revealed itself, one which 
hopefully will be populated by researchers more qualified than I. However, in order to give 
a proper closure to this work, it is suitable to conclude by answering the research questions 
outlined in the very beginning. 
Why is synthetic biology a special case? Synthetic biology has the potential to revolutionize 
our everyday lives by bringing true engineering principles to genetic engineering. In that 
pursuit, it will also adopt characteristics of fields that are not normally associated with 
biotechnology, such as electrical engineering and computing. The modular approach 
discussed in this work is of especially high relevance to all legal professionals and 
institutions, as it poses difficult questions in fields of private law, such as IP law, but also in 
bioethics, biosafety, and biosecurity. Multiple institutional actors have realized what is just 
over the horizon and have begun to adapt their regulations and policies to adapt. One very 
characteristic quality of synthetic biology is its commitment to keeping knowledge 
accessible, similar to how the open source ethos of Linux has taken shape over the past few 
decades. It is my hope that this area of free innovation will exist long into the future, and 
learn to co-exist with its more traditional sibling, the IP frame. 
How does synthetic biology relate to European patent law? In respect to patent law, the most 
natural way to view synthetic biology is as mostly an extension of pre-existing forms of 
biotechnology. The definitions contained by the Biotechnology Directive make it abundantly 
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clear that the European regulator will consider synthetic biology as such. As for the EPO, 
the question is more multifaceted. Given the EPC’s unshakeable dogma of technology 
neutrality, various existing jurisprudential solutions may have the potential to engender 
unintended consequences. This thesis contained only a minuscule sample of pertinent cases, 
meaning that follow-up research is definitely warranted to provide a more coherent picture 
of EPO jurisprudence in relation to synthetic biology. However, by and large, it would seem 
that Robienski & Simon are correct in stating that the novelty factor of synthetic biology as 
currently exists may be somewhat overstated527, as this work did not result in any 
conclusions that would necessitate a paradigm shift in patent protection. This is naturally 
subject to ongoing change. 
Patent fragmentation and overlap/transaction costs. The major problems that will quite 
likely become the bane of SynBio downstream developers’ existence are the tragedy of the 
anticommons and patent thickets. These issues are not unique to synthetic biology, but given 
the ever-increasing role they have to play in established fields of technology, they pose a 
severe threat to a nascent one. It is likely that developers will be faced with decreasing 
freedom to operate, unless both market actors, governmental institutions and an effective 
framework of governing SynBio IP. The compounded risks of high transaction costs and 
double-marginalization are difficult to overcome, but solutions do exist. The model 
developed in section 6.1.4. is an ideal that should be strived towards, as it provides the 
maximal reduction to fragmentation and transaction costs.  
Collective action. Building the model described above is likely to be a complicated 
proposition. Given the high levels of potential patent subject-matter inherent in developing 
novel organisms through the bioparts approach, it is difficult to align the interests of all 
relevant actors in the field. Both this and solving the overlap problem require institutional 
measures, both on the part of patent authorities, as well as publicly funded research 
institutions. The former must strive to increase patent quality by utilizing whatever means 
they have. If successful, such measures will likely ameliorate the underlying problem 
considerably. Universities and national research councils should take a proactive approach 
in shaping the future IP landscape, lest they become the victims of it. Furthermore, the UPC 
should adopt a pro-innovative approach in dealing with IP actors that merely seek to benefit 
from the detriment of others by extracting rents. So far, these patent trolls are not a 
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considerable problem in Europe, but if mismanaged, they may potentially become as 
detrimental a force in Europe as they currently are in the United States. One final caveat is 
issued in this respect: it might be difficult to distinguish between an innovation-generating 
pool and a collection of predatory patent trolls. As indicated above, this thesis was by no 
means a conclusive study on these issues. Further study on all of these question is definitely 
mandated, both because of the limited scope of this thesis, as well as the need to develop and 
modify the framework further  
In summation, it is hoped that this work will generate some modicum of interest in synthetic 
biology, be it scholarly or non-academic, focusing on the IP issues or the technology itself. 
As an effective layman, albeit a highly avid one, in questions related to molecular biology 
and normative economics, I certainly will follow the development of synthetic biology with 
a high level of interest. Given its promise, it may be the third milestone in our species 
mastery of biology. Perhaps it will even result in the predictions made by the participants in 
Calvert and Frow’s study becoming true, and we will have “tortoises that are also TV 
screens, and mini fighting dinosaurs”528. It just might be that creating novel organisms 
through the tools provided by synthetic biology will satisfy Feynman as well.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Background concepts and definitions for economic analysis 
I. Rational choice theory 
As stated in the methodology section, this thesis relies heavily on a law and economics 
approach. As with most forms of economics, it is based on an assumption of rationality of 
the relevant economic actors, which is also known as rational choice theory.529 This theory 
is in itself is contentious, meaning that an invoking an economic approach without discussing 
the rationality assumption would render the conclusions of this thesis questionable. The aim 
of this discussion is to formulate a rigorous rational choice theory that will serve as the 
theoretical cornerstone of the economic thought demonstrated in the thesis proper. 
The genesis of rational choice theory lies within Richard Posner’s seminal book, Economic 
Analysis of Law530. Posner formulated certain fundamental concepts that underlie his 
approach in law and economics. These concepts are contingent on his formulation of the 
assumption of rationality, which he posits as follows: “[M]an is a rational maximizer of his 
ends in life, his satisfactions — what we shall call his ‘self-interest.’”531. This notion of was 
criticized almost immediately. In one such influential critique, Arthur Allen Leff argues that 
the supposed empirical and scientific underpinnings of Posner’s rational choice theory were 
neither empirically formulated, nor were they even empirically verifiable.532  
In the intervening decades, other scholars created other forms of the assumption. Korobkin 
and Ulen sought to categorize these various forms of rational choice theory by placing them 
on a spectrum, ranging from “thin” to “thick” conceptions, with thinner versions being less 
scientifically rigorous and thick ones being more so. According to their critique, Posner’s 
definitional formulation is the thinnest of them all by virtue of providing no testable 
predictions, not delineating the scope of rationality (i.e. all behavior can be ex post described 
as rational) and being entirely non-falsifiable.533 The thickest form of rationality is one which 
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posits that actors seek to maximize their monetary and financial gains.534 Thick forms of the 
rational choice theorem are more rigorous in the sense that they make testable predictions, 
being clear in their scope and creating a clear criterion of falsifiability.535 If the economic 
actor acts in a way that does not maximize their short or long-term financial gains, the 
rationality assumption is falsified. 
A dialectic approach to rational choice theory and its criticism leaves us with a candidate for 
synthesis: limited liability companies. This choice is in part validated by legislation. As an 
example, Chapter 1, Section 5 of the Finnish Limited Liability Company Act 
(21.7.2006/624) provides that the purpose of the company is to generate profits to its 
shareholders, unless otherwise provided in the Articles of Association. This brings the 
purpose of a limited liability company very close to the thick form of rational choice theory. 
This leaves us with the empirical truth of the matter: do limited liability companies act this 
way? The traditional, Schumpeterian answer to this is that companies that fail to do so are 
eliminated through a market-generated Darwinian selection process.536 Other commentators 
have pointed out that groups of people, as generally found in companies, generally perform 
better on tasks measuring rational choice.537 However, commentators such as Langevoort 
have noted that managerial rationality in organizations is more of an ideal than an empirical 
truth, as lucrative IPRs can lead to a competency trap in which the competitive element of 
the free market is unable to ensure rational behavior.538 This question remains somewhat 
open, but it does not mean that a rational approach is without merit. Creating a framework 
based on the thick form of rational choice theory allows for SynBio companies themselves 
to adopt an IPR strategy that maximizes their utility. This changes the underlying form of 
rational choice theory to be a prescriptive claim on how synthetic biology IPR holders ought 
to act, instead of a descriptive claim on how they actually behave. 
It is now possible to formulate a rational choice theory that takes into account all of the above 
and which will serve as the basis of the economic analysis contained within this thesis: 
1) The holders of synthetic biology IPRs are generally speaking limited liability 
companies. 
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2) The relevant companies seek to maximize their financial gains (thick form of rational 
choice theory). 
3) It is not possible to determine whether the relevant companies act in full accordance 
to rational choice theory in managing their IPRs. 
4) It is in the interest of the companies themselves that they should act in accordance to 
rational choice theory, and they are capable of doing so in the limited question of 
IPR management. 
By adopting the wealth maximization version of the rationality assumption in this thesis, the 
results and suggestions contained herein can be falsified at least in part by providing 
empirical evidence that contradicts the assumptions above. In other words, if actors in the 
synthetic biology IPR landscape do not even intend to maximize their gains in a rational 
manner, the conclusions of this thesis can be considered suspect. 
II. Efficiency 
As stated in the introduction, the aim of the thesis proper is to create an efficient framework 
for synthetic biology IPR management that ensures the viability of the technology. What 
exactly does efficiency mean in this context? Unfortunately, there is no simple answer, as 
there are multiple forms of efficiency that must be considered together. In analyzing the 
incentives of innovation, Motta distinguishes between two forms of efficiency: ex ante 
efficiency and ex post efficiency. The former is characteristic of a regulatory system that 
seeks to incentivize firms to innovate and develop the market further, whereas the latter is 
concerned with the notion that, when an invention has been developed, it would be optimal 
for all relevant firms in the market to be able to utilize it freely, creating increased welfare 
through increased competition.539 Motta’s concepts are applications of the general economic 
concepts of dynamic and static efficiency540 respectively.  
Static and dynamic efficiency cannot be maximized simultaneously, as there is an inherent 
trade-off between the two. Optimizing static efficiency leads to lower prices in the short run, 
whereas optimizing dynamic efficiency leads to somewhat higher prices, but with the 
potential for innovations that increase overall efficiency in the future.541 It is easy to note the 
conflicting aims of these forms of efficiency in relation to IP policy. If one seeks to optimize 
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static efficiency, such as by not offering any form of IPRs protection, it reduces the 
innovator’s market power, which Motta argues is the primary incentive to engage in R&D.542 
This freeloading on other’s R&D in turn means that dynamic efficiency is greatly reduced, 
as innovators are unable to recoup their costs. This is of considerable concern. As Blaug 
points out, from a historic perspective, dynamic efficiency has had a greater positive impact 
on welfare than optimal static efficiency.543 Conversely, if the legislator would seek to 
optimize dynamic efficiency by offering expansive IPR protection, such as overly broad 
patent scope and length, it would easily result in the formation of monopolies.544 Monopolies 
are welfare detrimental both in terms of static and dynamic efficiency, as they are able to 
charge monopoly prices545 and have a lesser need to engage in further innovation to protect 
their market power546. 
As the purpose of this thesis proper is to ensure the viability and development of synthetic 
biology as a field, it is necessary to concentrate more on questions of dynamic efficiency. 
This is also justified in relation to the rationality choice theorem adopted in this thesis, as 
scholars of corporate economic strategy have emphasized the importance of dynamic 
efficiency in increasing market power, although reminding us that it would be erroneous to 
consider panacea in terms of corporate strategy.547 As the ultimate purpose is to ensure 
welfare, this approach is also justified by the notions presented by Motta. However, static 
efficiency creates a boundary for normative suggestions made in the name of dynamic 
efficiency. 
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